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I. INTRODUCTION
PANACEA: FROM GREEK PANAKEIA, A REMEDY OR
CURE REPUTED TO HEAL ALL DISEASES.'
According to the conventional wisdom, price discrimination of-
fers two advantages compared to uniform or linear pricing in the pro-
duction of copyrighted works. 2 First, it can reduce the deadweight
losses3 otherwise associated with the higher prices that copyright
makes possible.4 Second, it can increase the producer surplus or rents5
associated with the production of any given copyrighted work and
thus ensure the expected profitability of a wider range of works.6 This
increase in profitability should, in turn, lead to the production of more
copyrighted works. If the conventional wisdom is right, then the
proper response would be not merely to tolerate, but to actively pro-
mote price discrimination schemes with respect to works of author-
ship. Accordingly, if changes to copyright's existing legal rules would
enable more, or more perfect, price discrimination, then such changes
should be adopted.7
Of course, not everyone is so sanguine about price discrimination.
Existing economic and legal critiques have focused on the first sup-
posed advantage, and have shown that a shift to price discrimination
1. 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 122 (2d ed. 1989).
2. For an example of the conventional wisdom, see Richard A. Epstein, ProCD v. Zei-
denberg: Do Doctrine and Function Mix?, in CONTRACTS STORIES 94, 104-05 (Douglas G.
Baird ed., 2007).
3. A deadweight loss arises whenever goods are priced in excess of marginal cost. When
price exceeds marginal cost, some consumers who value the good at more than its marginal
cost, but less than its market price, will not buy it. The deadweight loss consists of the loss
in consumer and producer surplus attributable to such lost sales. See, e.g., William W. Fish-
er II, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1702 (1988).
4. See, e.g., William W. Fisher 111, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1203, 1240 (1998); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Comment, Atari Games v. Nintendo:
Does a Closed System Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 29, 41-46, 73 (1990)
(arguing that Nintendo's use of a lockout chip on its videogame system may result in price
discrimination and discussing the effects of such price discrimination).
5. Economic rent constitutes the difference between the amount paid for an input and the
amount necessary to induce that input to be supplied. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S.
BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 365 (7th ed. 1997).
6. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Eco-
nomics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1991) ("Price discrimination allows
producers to appropriate a larger share of the social benefits of their innovations and, thus,
may permit some innovations that would otherwise not occur."); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 315-16 (1996) (noting that
legal scholars who use standard economic analysis "maintain that copyright should lend
blanket support to owner ability to engage in price discrimination among various users, so
that owners can obtain their full complement of consumer surplus").
7. See, e.g., William W. Fisher Ill, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 172, 196-98 (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001)
(contending that some intellectual property theories would view enabling more price dis-
crimination through alterations in the first sale doctrine as positive for society).
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will not always reduce, and may sometimes increase, deadweight
losses.8 Yet, these critiques have not reduced the pervasive, almost
absurdly utopian perception of price discrimination9 - perhaps be-
cause they do not address price discrimination's second supposed ad-
vantage. As a result, these critiques leave open the argument that even
if a price discrimination scheme only converts consumer surplus into
producer surplus, it still enhances social welfare by increasing the
incentives to produce more and better works of authorship.
This Article reexamines the second supposed advantage and of-
fers an alternative critique of price discrimination as a panacea for the
monopoly costs copyright can impose. Both the traditional theoretical
account of the desirability of price discrimination and the existing
critiques rely on a partial equilibrium analysis. They examine the con-
sequences of various price discrimination schemes only for the spe-
cific market at issue - the market for a specific copyrighted work or
for copyrighted works more generally - and ignore or assume away
any effects on the remainder of the economy.
This use of partial equilibrium analysis is troubling. If an in-
creased ability to price discriminate, whether driven by technological
changes or changes in copyright law, leads to the production of more
works of authorship, the resources to produce those additional works
must come from somewhere. Over the long run, we cannot assume
8. For formal economic critiques, see Michael L. Katz, Nonuniform Pricing, Output and
Welfare Under Monopoly, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 37 (1983) (demonstrating that in a partial
equilibrium analysis, a switch from uniform pricing to second-degree price discrimination
generates ambiguous effects on social welfare); see also Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree
Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259
(1990) (demonstrating that, in a partial equilibrium analysis, a switch from uniform pricing
to third-degree price discrimination will increase welfare in some cases and reduce it in
others).
For legal critiques that rely on economic analysis, see Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried
View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000)
(arguing that because price discrimination is costly to implement, whether it is socially
beneficial will depend on whether enhanced consumer access to excludable works will
outweigh the loss from reduction in free access to previously non-excluded works); Julie E.
Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000) (stating that real
world evidence indicates that contractual price discrimination does not function as smoothly
as its proponents claim); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:
Implications for Contract, 73 CHi-KENT. L. REV. 1367 (1998) (finding that, at best, price
discrimination is a way of nullifying the negative effects of monopolies, but that it also may
"raise price and reduce quantities, without yielding any incentive payoff large enough to
compensate"); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copy-
right Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845 (1997) (discussing how the intro-
duction of realism into traditional discussions of the benefits of price discrimination raises
doubts about whether price discrimination results in efficiency gains).
9. See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 55, 64 (2001) ("Until recently, copyright scholars failed to link specific copyright
doctrines to the practice of price discrimination and when they have noticed price discrimi-
nation, they tend to share a rosy view of its effect on social welfare. Since there has been
little controversy about social welfare effects, there has been little commentary.").
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that the necessary resources would otherwise have been left idle.'
0
Rather, to produce more works of authorship, the resources must be
taken from some other productive sectors of the economy. This is not
to say that the resource necessary to produce more works of author-
ship, namely creativity, is ultimately limited - a nonrenewable re-
source, as it were - but simply an acknowledgement that creativity,
like any other resource, is scarce. At any point, the time and talent
used to write a book, direct a movie, or compose a song cannot simul-
taneously be used for something else. This raises the question of
whether encouraging people to devote additional time and talent to
producing more works of authorship generates more value for society
than the something else to which those resources would otherwise
have been devoted."
Partial equilibrium analysis answers this question by assuming
that the remainder of the economy consists of markets that are both
complete 12 and perfectly competitive. So long as the remainder of the
economy satisfies these assumptions, every other market will, at equi-
librium, reach a point where both the marginal social value and cost,
and the marginal private value and cost, are equal and fully reflected
in the price of the resources.' 3 Given these assumptions, if implement-
ing a price discrimination scheme enables the producers of copy-
righted works to offer a higher price for the resources necessary to
10. As Fritz Machlup has explained, "Whenever permanent economic policies... are
discussed, sound economics must start from the principle that no activity can be promoted
without encroaching on some other activity. More of one service or product must mean less
of another." STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM,
at 46 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup).
11. See Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, I ECONOMICA 167,
170 (1934) (discussing whether the monopoly provided to copyright holders is beneficial to
the economy); see also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (1967)
(arguing that copyright may "run the risk of attracting too much of the nation's energy into
the copy-righted protected sectors of the economy"); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuch-
man, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 425, 430 (1966) (con-
tending that resources may be misallocated when too much copyright protection is given);
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 483, 489 (1996) (suggesting that failure to consider the opportunity cost associated
with increased incentives to create copyrighted works "renders the incentives-paradigm
worthless as a guide to copyright's proper limits"); Meurer, supra note 9, at 96-97 (arguing
that optimal incentive for the production of copyrighted works is reached at something less
than recovery of the full surplus).
12. A market is complete if it contains no externalities. That is, in a complete market,
there are no actions by consumers or producers that "lead to costs or benefits that are not
reflected in the price of the product in the market." DAVID A. BESANKO & RONALD R.
BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 355 (2d ed. 2005).
13. Marginal social cost is equal to the sum of marginal private cost and incidental cost
(costs borne by others). Likewise, marginal social value is equal to the sum of marginal
private value and incidental value. BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 5, at 305-06. In a mar-
ket with no externalities there are no incidental costs; therefore, marginal social value and
cost must equal marginal private value and cost.
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produce additional works, then this ability to pay more establishes that
producing more works is the most valuable use of those resources.
The fatal flaw of relying on partial equilibrium analysis is that the
remainder of the economy does not consist of complete and perfectly
competitive markets. This limitation has been apparent for years; in
1956, R.G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster proved that this essential, yet
mistaken assumption is material. 14 Most economists and economi-
cally-minded legal scholars have nevertheless eschewed the use of
more realistic second-best equilibrium analysis for the simpler models
and clearer answers generated by partial equilibrium approaches. 15 If
pressed, those who rely on partial equilibrium analysis would first
argue that the economy, even if not perfectly competitive, comes
close enough. Second, they would argue that because perfect competi-
tion represents the desired ideal, perfect competition should be as-
sumed because all other markets should be moving in that direction,
even if some are not yet there.
Neither of these justifications, however, excuses the use of partial
equilibrium analysis for copyrighted works. When discussing the pro-
duction of more or fewer works of authorship, the central resource at
issue is creativity. Unlike other markets, markets for creativity are
fundamentally incompatible with perfect competition.16 Incentives for
the production of any type of creative product cannot exist if there is
perfect competition. When a new product is introduced in a perfectly
competitive market, it is instantly copied and perfect substitutes are
made available, with prices driven immediately to marginal cost. As a
result, some degree of monopoly or market power is essential to have
any financial incentive to produce creative products at all. Markets for
creativity are thus not perfectly competitive; nor does perfect competi-
tion represent the desired ideal. The usual justifications for partial
equilibrium analysis do not apply.
Moving away from the assumptions inherent in a partial equilib-
rium analysis leads to the world of the second-best. 7 No longer are
14. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.
STUD. I1, 16-17 (1956). In their analysis, Lipsey and Lancaster address whether a move
from monopoly to competition in a particular market improve social welfare. The answer
from a partial equilibrium analysis is an unambiguous yes, but as they show, if the rest of
the economy contains monopoly elements, then the answer is indeterminate. Depending on
the nature and the extent of the monopoly elements in the rest of the economy, a move to
competition in any one market could either increase or decrease social welfare.
15. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An In-
troduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1998).
16. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 617 (2d prtg. 1964) ("In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is
supported by using the invention to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is
successful, there is an underutilization of the information.").
17. Economics is a curious science. It is the only one that ranks models on the extent to
which they differ from an "ideal" perfect competition model. Most sciences look for models
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the effects on other markets assumed away by reciting the magic Latin
incantation ceteris paribus - all else constant. Instead, one must ex-
pressly account for how changes in one imperfect market affect other
imperfect markets. This Article presents a second-best model to ex-
amine the allocation of creativity in an economy. Instead of assuming
perfect competition in all other markets, this model assumes that mar-
ket power persists in all markets for creative goods. Using this as-
sumption, it then examines the welfare consequences associated with
a switch to perfect price discrimination in the market for one particu-
lar type of creative good. This model can be described as consisting of
one market for copyrighted works and a second market for all other
creative, non-copyrighted products. The model could also be de-
scribed as having one market for a particular type of copyrighted
work, such as films or books, or for a particular class of copyrighted
works, such as digitally-distributed works, and a second market for all
other copyrighted works. For either description, the key assumption is
that to produce more of a given creative product, the necessary re-
sources will come from another creative sector that is also imperfectly
competitive or monopolistic, rather than from a non-creative sector
that satisfies the assumptions of the perfect competition model., 8
The adoption of more realistic assumptions radically alters the
welfare consequences associated with a shift to perfect price discrimi-
nation. 19 In particular, the second-best model demonstrates that the
second supposed advantage of price discrimination - providing addi-
tional incentives for the production of more and better works of au-
thorship - may actually be a disadvantage. The more and better
that mimic the real world and measure a model's accuracy with respect to real world con-
siderations. Economists, on the other hand, label their models as "first-best," "second-best,"
and so on based upon the extent to which they differ from the perfect competition model.
This methodology could just be a labeling tradition, with no normative significance, except
for the fact that it also seems to reflect a bias in economists' thinking as well - namely, that
there is something wrong with the real world when it fails to follow the dictates of their
models, as opposed to there being something wrong with their models when they fail to
reflect the real world.
18. Forty years ago, Benjamin Kaplan raised the possibility that too much copyright
would risk "attracting too much of the nation's energy into the copyright-protected sectors
of the economy." KAPLAN, supra note I1, at 75. From a partial equilibrium perspective, the
assertion is unfounded. Given the assumption that all other markets are complete and per-
fectly competitive, whatever rights copyright may provide, as long as the producers of copy-
righted works can afford to pay more for the resources necessary to create additional works,
that fact alone necessarily establishes that the production of additional copyrighted works
represents the highest and best use of those resources. Yet, the specter Kaplan raises be-
comes very real once it is recognized that producers of copyrighted works probably compete
for resources with other creative sectors of the economy.
19. This sort of reversal is not uncommon in moving from partial to general equilibrium
analysis. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 538-40 (1995)
(presenting an example in which the natve application of partial equilibrium analysis sug-
gests that firm owners in one city bear the full burden of a tax on labor imposed by that city
and contrasting that incorrect result with the general equilibrium conclusion proving that
labor bears full burden of tax).
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works that price discrimination renders profitable do not necessarily
represent a net social gain; this characterization is an illusion gener-
ated by the unrealistic assumptions underlying the partial equilibrium
approach. Rather, this increased output in the price discriminating
sector of the economy occurs at the expense of reducing output in the
other, non-price discriminating creative sectors. In general, the in-
creased copyright output in the price discriminating sector will usually
prove less valuable to society than the alternative creative uses to
which the resources would otherwise have been devoted.
This analysis suggests that copyright law ought to be far less tol-
erant of arguments that rely on the supposed efficiency advantages of
price discrimination. Although the second-best model identifies some
situations in which price discrimination may improve social welfare,
these situations are very limited. Moreover, having peered behind the
curtain and found the second advantage of price discrimination to be
illusory, price discrimination's sole remaining advantage compared to
uniform pricing is its potential to reduce deadweight losses.
In the copyright context, however, the potential for reducing
deadweight losses is not much of an advantage. Copyright industries
are usually characterized as having imperfect or monopolistic compe-
tition, rather than a straightforward monopoly. As a result, deadweight
losses are likely to be small. Even in those circumstances where
deadweight losses are more substantial, those losses can often be
eliminated by narrowing copyright protection. 20 This approach would
eliminate deadweight losses without generating, as price discrimina-
tion would, too much incentive for investing in copyrighted works and
thus leading to a misallocation of society's creativity.
This Article takes up these issues in turn. Part i briefly intro-
duces perfect or first-degree price discrimination and its efficiency
advantages in a partial equilibrium analysis. Part Ill considers a sec-
ond-best equilibrium model and uses it to examine the supposed effi-
ciency advantages of first-degree price discrimination. Given the
second-best equilibrium conclusions, Part IV addresses the various
price discrimination schemes routinely employed in the marketing of
20. See infra text accompanying notes 25-27. To address the concern that a copyright
owner will market only a hardcover in the absence of price discrimination, copyright's fair
use doctrine could be read more broadly, thus allowing others to publish low price paper-
backs. This solution would address the potential deadweight loss associated with that con-
cern. For much of the nineteenth century, others could freely prepare and distribute their
own translations and abridgements of copyrighted works. See Lunney, supra note II, at
534-36. While it is politically unlikely that the United States will ever return to that copy-
right model, we must recognize that a limitation on copyright can reduce deadweight losses
as or more effectively than price discrimination serves two purposes. First, even if we are
not going to reduce the scope of copyright, we should still understand the full extent of the
social welfare losses that overly broad copyright entails. Second, other countries are not yet
fully bound to the United States' exuberantly excessive copyright regime, leaving open the
possibility that another country may adopt this approach.
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copyrighted works and evaluates their likely welfare consequences in
the real world. Part V concludes.
II. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND COPYRIGHT IN A PARTIAL
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Copyright law may sometimes directly enable, indirectly allow,
or ultimately limit a copyright owner's ability to price discriminate. In
the context of derivative work2' and public performance22 rights, cop-
yright affirmatively and specifically enables price discrimination.
For example, if a person wants to make a derivative use, such as mak-
ing a movie from a book or broadcasting a song over the radio, she
cannot simply purchase a copy of the book or album in the open mar-
ket and proceed with her planned use. 24 Because these uses differ
from the ordinary uses - such as reading the book or listening to the
album - individuals who intend to make derivative uses are likely to
value their use quite differently from, and often more highly than,
ordinary consumers. To enable the copyright owner to capture this
higher valuation, copyright law generally requires a derivative user to
obtain the copyright owner's specific permission for her intended use.
This permission requirement enables the copyright owner to segment
and price such uses separately from the uses of ordinary consumers.
In other instances, copyright does not specifically enable or limit
price discrimination, but instead provides legal rights that a copyright
owner can use to establish a price discrimination scheme. For exam-
ple, copyright owners have the exclusive right to reproduce their25
works. While the right does not itself segment different consumers
into different markets, copyright owners have nonetheless used this
reproduction right to implement such price discrimination schemes. In
the publishing industry, a copyright owner can offer a high-priced
hardcover first and then wait a year to offer a lower-priced paperback
as a way of separating high reservation value26 consumers from low
reservation value consumers. The reproduction right prohibits anyone
else from offering a paperback in the meantime and thereby provides
the necessary legal background rule for the scheme to work. Simi-
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (granting the copyright owner the exclu-
sive right "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work," which would
include a film version or a translation of a novel).
22. Id. § 106(4), (6) (granting the copyright owner the exclusive right to perform certain
kinds of copyrighted works publicly, such as by performing the work on the radio, in a
concert hall, or in a stadium).
23. See Lunney, supra note 1I, at 628-53.
24. See id.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l).
26. A consumer's reservation value is the maximum price that the consumer is willing to
pay for that unit of a good. BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 12, at 449.
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larly, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,27 the copyright
owner used the reproduction right to establish a system of per-copy
charging for scientific articles 28 in order to separate and charge ac-
cordingly research institutions that made more copies of a work, and
hence may have valued the work more highly, from institutions that
made fewer copies.
29
In addition to enabling price discrimination, copyright also con-
tains provisions that limit a copyright owner's ability to price dis-
criminate. These provisions include doctrines such as fair use,3° first
sale, 3 and preemption. 32 Although each of these doctrines addresses a
different set of issues, all of them may potentially limit a copyright
owner's ability to separate, and price accordingly, high and low reser-
vation value consumers.
Whether copyright enables or limits price discrimination, either
generally or in any particular instance, depends on the precise inter-
play between these doctrines. For example, the price discrimination at
issue in American Geophysical Union was only permissible under
copyright law because the Second Circuit rejected Texaco's argument
that the institution's copying of the works for use by its researchers
constituted fair use. 33 Had the court accepted Texaco's broader inter-
pretation of the fair use doctrine, the copyright owner could not have
continued its per-copy price discrimination scheme.
34
Thus, understanding the welfare consequences of price discrimi-
nation is critically important to copyright law. If, as this Article sug-
gests, price discrimination in markets for copyrighted works is
generally undesirable because it has the effect of reducing social wel-
fare, then copyright doctrines that limit the ability of copyright owners
to price discriminate should be interpreted more broadly. At the same
27. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
28. See id. at 916-17 (holding that Texaco committed copyright infringement when it
made unauthorized photocopies of copyrighted scientific articles for its researchers when a
per-copy licensing scheme for obtaining authorization was in place).
29. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use as Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975, 1020-23 (2002).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
31. Id. § 109 (allowing the owner of a copy to generally give, sell, rent, or otherwise dis-
pose of that copy as she sees fit, notwithstanding the right of the copyright owner to control
her work's distribution in § 106(3)).
32. Id. § 301 (preempting and rendering unenforceable as a general matter state law
rights that are "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
right.., in works of authorship"). Preemption has become more important in recent years
as copyright holders have attempted to enforce their rights through contract and digital
rights management ("DRM"). DRM is a form of software or code added to or included with
digitally-stored works. It controls or limits the consumer's ability to use or copy the digi-
tally-stored work (or is supposed to).
33. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 918-32.
34. This alternate ruling would not have entirely eliminated the copyright owner's ability
to price discriminate because it would have left intact the practice of charging institutional
and individual consumers different prices. See Lunney, supra note 29, at 1021 n. 170.
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time, those doctrines that enable price discrimination should be inter-
preted more narrowly. For years conventional wisdom has character-
ized price discrimination with respect to copyrighted works as
generally welfare enhancing; consequently, the opposite trend has
prevailed.35 To determine whether this trend should continue, it is
necessary to begin with the conventional wisdom.
A. The Existing Theoretical Background of Price Discrimination
To illustrate the efficiency advantages of first-degree price dis-
crimination in a partial equilibrium analysis, the first step is to com-
pare the optimal pricing and welfare consequences under (1) uniform
pricing and (2) first-degree price discrimination. Under uniform or
linear pricing, a producer with market power will charge a single uni-
form price for each and every unit of the good sold. To maximize her
profit, the producer will determine that uniform price by producing
additional units of the good until her marginal revenue equals her
marginal cost. She will then set her price to clear the market, so that
consumer demand will equal her output.
36
Using this approach, a profit-maximizing producer with market
power will set her price at a level somewhat above her marginal cost.
This supracompetitive pricing generates rents for the rights holder, but
it creates a gap between price and marginal cost that will force some
consumers who would have purchased the product at the lower, com-
petitive price to forego consumption of the product and turn to some
less desirable substitute. In partial equilibrium analysis, the familiar
deadweight loss triangle 37 represents the welfare loss associated with
the supracompetitive price.
In contrast, under first-degree price discrimination, the producer
will charge each consumer the consumer's precise reservation value
for each unit of the good purchased. To achieve such price discrimina-
tion, a monopolist may have to charge each consumer a different price
for the good. Even for a single consumer, a monopolist may have to
charge that consumer a different price for each unit purchased. With
uniform pricing, any reduction in the price charged to one consumer
also reduces the price charged to every other consumer. As a result,
the producer has to balance the additional sales that could be achieved
by setting a lower price against the revenue lost from reducing the
price charged to consumers willing to pay a higher price. In contrast, a
first-degree price discrimination scheme allows the producer to charge
35. See supra notes 8-9.
36. See, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 144 (1934).
37. The deadweight loss triangle refers to the graphical representation of deadweight loss
which occurs in markets that are not perfectly competitive. For an example of such a graph,
see BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 12, at 432 fig. 11. 16.
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consumers prices precisely tailored to their reservation values without
affecting the price charged to other consumers. Accordingly, the mar-
ginal revenue under first-degree price discrimination for each unit
sold is simply the price charged for that unit; the producer will sell
additional units up to the point where marginal cost equals inverse
demand.
Because the price discriminating producer will charge a price for
the last unit sold equal to both its marginal cost and marginal value,
there is no gap between price and marginal cost for the marginal unit.
As a result, first-degree price discrimination eliminates the dead-
weight loss associated with uniform pricing. Each consumer is
charged precisely her reservation value for each unit of the good; no
one is forced to do without the good or accept a less perfect substitute
because of the monopolist's pricing structure. Moreover, under first-
degree price discrimination, the output levels and social welfare are
identical to what would be achieved under perfect competition, under
which price would be set equal to marginal cost. Assuming that a mo-
nopoly exists, first-degree price discrimination is Pareto optimal38 (at
least within the context of a partial equilibrium analysis) and, from a
social welfare perspective, clearly superior to uniform pricing.39
Because these results are mathematical truisms within the context
of a partial equilibrium analysis, there is room for only limited, effi-
ciency-based critiques of first-degree price discrimination. First, one
can simply deny the existence of first-degree price discrimination in
real world markets. Although instructive as a purely theoretical con-
cept, it is difficult to imagine any real world situation under which a
producer could precisely determine and charge each consumer her
exact reservation value, while precluding arbitrage altogether. If a
producer attempted to do so, high reservation value consumers would
pretend to have a low reservation value in order to obtain a lower
price for the good; low reservation value consumers would seek to
resell their lower price units to high reservation value consumers. As a
practical matter, in the real world, a producer will almost always have
38. As a leading economics text defines it: "An allocation that is Pareto optimal uses so-
ciety's initial resources and technological possibilities efficiently in the sense that there is no
alternative way to organize the production and distribution of goods that makes some con-
sumer better off without making some other consumer worse off." MAS-COLELL ET AL.,
supra note 19, at 313.
39. Professor Mankiw concludes his comparison of uniform pricing and first-degree price
discrimination as follows:
[WIhen a firm can perfectly price discriminate.., each customer who
values the goods at more than marginal cost buys the good and is
charged his willingness to pay. All mutually beneficial trades take
place, there is no deadweight loss, and the entire surplus derived from
the market goes to the monopoly producer in the form of profit.
N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 338 (2d ed. 2001).
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to rely on some less perfect form of price discrimination. 40 From an
efficiency perspective, the desirability of less perfect forms of price
discrimination is unclear, even within the context of partial equilib-
rium analysis.
41
Second, first-degree price discrimination enables the producer to
capture the entire surplus associated with the good. Under perfect
competition, the consumer captures the surplus between the price and
consumer's reservation value because price is set equal to marginal
cost. Even under uniform monopoly pricing, consumers typically re-
tain some part of the available surplus. However, with first-degree
price discrimination, the producer captures all the available surplus,
transferring wealth from consumers to the producer. While econo-
mists generally consider this transfer as a distributional issue without
efficiency consequences, Richard Posner has suggested that it may
have efficiency consequences to the extent that the rents available will
lead individuals to spend resources to capture those rents.42 As a theo-
retical matter, a producer would presumably be willing to spend an
amount up to the rents available in an attempt to capture them. Any
such expenditure will necessarily reduce the surplus available on at
least a dollar-for-dollar basis by converting the surplus into expense.
B. Application of Existing Theories to Copyright
To explore the existing partial equilibrium analysis, consider two
longstanding examples of price discrimination associated with the
production of copyrighted works. The practice in the book publishing
industry serves as the first example. Publishers initially offer a high
priced hardcover of a novel before offering a low priced paperback a
year later. In doing so, publishers are attempting to separate high res-
ervation value consumers from low reservation value consumers.
High reservation value consumers will purchase the hardcover while
low reservation value consumers will wait for the lower priced paper-
back. Some commentators have argued that the sale of hardcovers and
paperbacks does not constitute price discrimination but merely an at-
40. Following the nomenclature established by A.C. Pigou, second-degree price dis-
crimination schemes distinguish between the reservation values of an apparently homoge-
nous group of consumers based on the choices consumers make between the different price-
product packages offered by the monopolist. Third-degree price discrimination schemes
attempt to distinguish between the reservation values of consumers based upon observed
differences (e.g. age, apparent wealth, occupation, location) that are related to consumers'
likely reservation values. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 134-35 (14th prtg. 1998).
41. See sources cited supra note 8.
42. See RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11 (1976)
("[A]n opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of monopoly profits
will attract real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize, and by consumers to prevent
being charged monopoly prices.").
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tempt to satisfy consumers' demands for different editions.43 How-
ever, if the publisher did not intend to price discriminate, it would
offer both editions at the same time. For some extremely popular
works, such a simultaneous offering may occur; this Article will focus
on the far more common practice of offering the two versions sequen-
tially.
The distribution scheme in this example is not first-degree price
discrimination. However, compared to selling either a hardcover only
or a paperback only at a uniform price, the scheme offers the same
dual advantages of price discrimination. First, separating consumers
into two markets may reduce deadweight loss by allowing the copy-
right holder to offer the paperback at a somewhat lower price than if
only the paperback were available. Second, the combined producer
surplus available from selling both a hardcover and a paperback is
necessarily higher than selling either version alone; otherwise, the
copyright holder would not engage in the price discrimination
scheme. The additional surplus available to the producer may ensure
the profitability of additional works. The price discrimination scheme
may thereby lead to the production of more and better works.44
In evaluating the welfare implications of this price discrimination
scheme, existing critiques note that the savings in deadweight losses
are likely to be small and the transaction costs incurred to establish
the system are likely to be substantial. 45 Prices for the paperback ver-
sion may be lower with price discrimination, but consumers must wait
additional time before the paperback becomes available. Thus, any
reduction in deadweight loss is likely to be slight. At the same time,
the implementation of the price discrimination scheme imposes sub-
stantial costs, because a hardcover is more expensive to produce than
46
a paperback. Absent the price discrimination scheme, a publisher
could offer both hardcovers and paperbacks at the same time and
likely would produce far fewer hardcovers in response to consumer
demand. The publisher's effort to price discriminate directly increases
43. See, e.g., Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100(1971).
44. This conclusion follows from the usual assumption in copyright that more money
means more and better works and ignores the backward bending nature of the labor supply
curve. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying,
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 887 (2001). For information
on the theory that the labor supply curve is backward bending, see G. Hanoch, The "Back-
ward-Bending" Supply of Labor, 73 J. POL. ECON. 502 (1965).
45. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 8, at 2072 ("Implementing price discrimination is
costly. The producer must invest in identifying discrete market categories that would bear
different prices. It must also take measures - technical, contractual, marketing, or any
combination - to prevent arbitrage of the good from low value users to high value users.").
46. Publishers could simply sell a highly priced paperback initially, and then reduce the
price later. Presumably, the decision by publishers not to use this strategy may reflect their
desire to avoid angering consumers, who would undoubtedly complain about such a
straightforward price gouging strategy.
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the costs associated with a given work and thereby reduces the associ-
ated producer and consumer surplus.
Film companies are another example of an industry that uses a
similar price discrimination scheme. Initially, companies offer the
film only in first-run theaters before expanding the film's availability
to DVDs, Pay-Per-View, subscription cable, and broadcast television.
Again, the scheme relies on offering physically differentiated versions
of the work at different points in time to separate high and low reser-
vation value consumers while simultaneously preventing arbitrage.
This price discrimination scheme may reduce deadweight losses, as
some films might otherwise be offered only in theaters.47 It also in-
creases the producer surplus associated with each film and thus may
ensure the creation of more and better works.
However, as with books, with films the price discrimination
scheme likely reduces deadweight losses only slightly while entailing
significant costs. The per unit costs of showing a film in first-run thea-
ters is far higher than showing the film on broadcast television. If the
film company were not trying to price discriminate, it could offer the
film simultaneously through all of these distribution channels. Al-
though some people might still choose to see the film in a theater, in a
simultaneous distribution scheme that number would probably be
smaller than under the price discrimination scheme. As a result, with-
out the price discrimination scheme, fewer resources would be spent
on first-run theaters and a more streamlined and cost effective distri-
bution scheme likely would develop. Again, the film company's de-
sire to capture a larger portion of the available surplus results in an
expenditure of resources that directly reduces the available surplus.
In either example, if it were simply a question of balancing the
reduction in deadweight losses against the transaction costs, these
price discrimination schemes would likely generate little, if any, net
welfare gain, and might entail significant net welfare losses. While in
both examples instituting a price discrimination scheme may reduce
deadweight losses, any reduction in deadweight loss is probably
slight. At the same time, both schemes are costly to implement.
A partial equilibrium analysis suggests, however, that is not the
end of the issue. While implementing price discrimination is expen-
sive and that expense represents a real efficiency loss,48 doing so en-
47. If a copyright owner of a film was forced to choose between: (I) first-run theaters, (2)
broadcast or premium television, or (3) DVD as a method of distribution, I'm not certain
that all copyright owners would choose (2) or (3). Some might plausibly choose just (i) in
order to capitalize on those consumers with the highest reservation values.
48. Moreover, while a monopolist will ensure that a price discrimination scheme is worth
the costs from the monopolist's point of view, the monopolist's rationality does not ensure
that social welfare will increase as a result of her scheme. The monopolist will ensure only
that the costs of the price discrimination scheme are less than the additional producer sur-
plus earned as a result of the scheme. But that additional producer surplus can come from
either reducing deadweight loss or converting consumer surplus. If the sole or primary ef-
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ables rights holders to capture additional surplus. This additional sur-
plus may result in the production of works that would not have been
created but for the price discrimination scheme. For example, expen-
sive films rely on the revenues generated through the sequential re-
lease to the theatre and post-theatre markets in order to break even. In
a partial equilibrium analysis, so long as the total revenue generated
exceeds the work's costs, the creation of an additional marginal work
would be desirable and welfare-enhancing. Society should therefore
expect a net social benefit because the value added by the additional
marginal works financed by a price discrimination scheme will be
greater than the costs of establishing the scheme, or so the partial
equilibrium analysis would conclude.
Both of these examples of price discrimination succeed in sepa-
rating high reservation value consumers from low reservation value
consumers because they minimize the ability of consumers to engage
in arbitrage. However, the first sale doctrine4 ' has limited the extent to
which copyright owners can engage in price discrimination. Under the
first sale doctrine, once the copyright owner has sold a copy of her
work, the purchaser "is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy."
50
Accordingly, once a film studio decides to sell a copyrighted work on
DVD, there are two markets that the company may seek to separate
through a price discrimination scheme: (I) individual consumers who
are purchasing the DVD for their own consumption, and (2) video
rental stores that are purchasing the DVD in order to rent it to their
consumers. The first sale doctrine prevents the film company from
separating these two markets. If the film company tries to offer a low
priced DVD for consumer consumption and a high priced DVD for
video rental store consumption, the first sale doctrine enables the vid-
eo rental stores to simply purchase the low priced consumer DVD.
Under these conditions, the price discrimination scheme will fail.5'
The first sale doctrine does not fully preclude companies from engag-
ing in price discrimination; it does, however, effectively limit the film
company to those schemes that assure the video rental stores at least
as much profit as they could earn by buying and then renting to their
customers the low priced consumer DVDs.
fect of a price discrimination scheme is to transfer consumer surplus to the producer, then
adopting a price discrimination scheme can represent a rational decision for the monopolist,
but still impose a net welfare loss on society.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
50. Id. § 109(a).
51. In 1980, Disney tried such a two-track marketing system, but rental stores simply
purchased the low priced consumer cassettes and ignored the license provisions Disney
implemented in an attempt to separate rental and consumer cassettes. JAMES LARDNER,
FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 192
(1987).
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A partial equilibrium analysis suggests that the limitations im-
posed by the first sale doctrine on copyright owners' ability to price
discriminate are undesirable for both copyright owners and society.
52
The analysis further suggests that the law ought to be changed to en-
able such price discrimination. 53 Since the mid-1980s, copyright own-
ers have sought to limit the first sale doctrine through legislative and
judicial means. First, copyright owners have asked Congress to amend
or repeal the doctrine.54 These efforts have typically been successful
only where the redistribution of the work threatened widespread, un-
authorized copying.55 Second, copyright owners have asked courts to
enforce a form agreement, namely an End User License Agreement
("EULA"), attached to or included in the work.56 These form agree-
ments specifically re-characterize the transaction as a license. If a
court enforces the form agreement and accepts this re-
characterization,57 then the copyright owner will not be subject to the
first sale doctrine. Although the consumer will possess a copy, she
will possess the copy as a licensee and not as an owner.58 Hence the
express language of § 109, the first sale doctrine, will not apply.
59
Most recently, copyright owners have focused on ensuring that
the first sale doctrine is not extended to the Internet. Digital transfers
automatically make a second copy on the recipient's computer. Al-
though the sender could erase the original copy and thereby replicate
52. See sources cited supra note 8.
53. See, e.g., Julie Holland Mortimer, Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Techno-
logical Innovation: Evidence from the Introduction ofDVDs, 122 Q. J. ECON. 1307, 1341-
42 (2007) (analyzing price discrimination strategies in the videocassette and DVD markets,
and using a partial equilibrium analysis to argue that both consumer and studio welfare
would be higher if copyright owners could control the rental market directly).
54. For an account of the film industry's battle to eliminate the first sale doctrine in re-
sponse to the introduction of the VCR, see LARDNER, supra note 5 I, at 286-88.
55. Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5134 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2000)); Record Rental Amendment of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)
(2000)). For an example of how copyright owners have used attempted to use judicial means
to limit the first sale doctrine, see Lunney, Jr., supra note 44, at 902-04 (recounting the film
industry's attempt to obtain judicial interpretations of the public performance doctrine that
would effectively block unauthorized videotape rentals).
56. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir.
1991) (noting the computer software industry's development of licenses to avoid the first
sale doctrine).
57. Compare id. at 105-06 (excluding license terms from the parties' contract), with
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (incorporating license
terms into the parties' contract).
58. For the typical consumer, there is no difference in the substance of the transaction
whether it is characterized as a sale or a license. She will pay the copyright owner a set price
at the time she obtains the copy and will not be subject to additional payments or license
fees. However, characterizing the transaction as a license will prevent the consumer from
taking advantage of: (1) the right to resell the copy accorded an "owner" under the first sale
doctrine and (2) the right to make copies essential to use the copy under § 117(a). 17 U.S.C.
§§ 109(a), 117(a) (2000).
59. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 96 n.7.
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the transfer of an analog or physical copy, the fact that the transfer
creates a second copy makes it unclear whether the first sale doctrine
would apply.6° Copyright owners have opposed efforts to amend the
first sale doctrine to expressly cover digital transfers. It is unclear
whether copyright owners are opposing such an amendment because
they fear that digital transfers will lead to unauthorized additional
copies (i.e., when the sender both sends a copy to another and keeps
her own) or because they fear that such transfers will limit the oppor-
tunities for price discrimination. In either event, the Copyright Office
has issued a report supporting the copyright owners' position and rec-
ommending that Congress not amend the first sale doctrine to make it
expressly applicable to digital transfers.61
Partial equilibrium analysis also suggests that recognizing an ex-
clusive right to control private performances of copyrighted works
may soon become welfare-enhancing, as the costs of enforcing such a
right continue to fall due to technological innovations. With prior
technology, enforcing a per listen pricing scheme would have been
unduly expensive and completely impracticable. However, tracking
the number of times consumers watch or listen to a copyrighted work
is now becoming increasingly feasible because of networked digital
technology. 62 Indeed, many existing digital devices already track such
information. In many cases, they are also already connected to the
Internet or other communications systems, either intermittently, such
as iPods, or permanently, such as digital video recorders ("DVRs").
As a result, these devices can readily "phone home" to provide copy-
right owners with detailed usage information.
63
As digital technology approaches the point where the transaction
costs of enforcing the copyright owners' private performance right
become sufficiently low, the existence of such a right would likely
improve a copyright owner's ability to separate, and to charge differ-
ent prices to high and low reservation value consumers. To the extent
that the number of times an individual watches or listens to a given
work is an effective proxy for that individual's reservation value, such
per-access pricing would prove an effective metering device and
hence price discrimination scheme.64 By enabling copyright owners to
60. See I U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 79-80 (2001).
61. See id. at 78-80, 96-101.
62. See Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Property and Pri-
vacy in an Era of Trusted Privacation, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1214-15 (2000) (discussing
a future scenario in which trusted systems are used to monitor and limit a consumer's use of
copyrighted works).
63. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET - AND HOW TO STOP IT
101-02, 110-11 (2008).
64. Even here, the price discrimination scheme is not perfect. On average, a person who
listens to a song one hundred times may well value the work more than a person who listens
to the song twice. However, that is likely to be true only on average. This limitation arises
because a consumer's willingness to pay is not necessarily the same as her ability to pay.
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price discriminate more effectively, recognizing a private perform-
ance right would, at least according to the conventional wisdom, en-
hance social welfare by reducing deadweight losses and by
encouraging the production of more and better works.
From a partial equilibrium perspective, the desirability of amend-
ing the Copyright Act to limit the first sale doctrine, accepting the
copyright owner's characterization of the transaction as a license, or
refusing to extend the doctrine to file transfers over the Internet ap-
pears reasonably clear. Recognizing a right to control private per-
formances, again whether through formal amendment of the
Copyright Act or by allowing copyright owners to implement such
controls through contracts and DRM technologies, appears equally
clear. Yet, before embracing these conclusions, the question remains
whether the advantages of first-degree price discrimination, so clear in
a partial equilibrium setting, will survive a more general equilibrium
analysis. As this Article will show, they do not.
III. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN A SECOND-BEST ANALYSIS
The supposed efficiency advantages of first-degree price dis-
crimination become far less compelling under a more general equilib-
rium analysis. This Part aims to illustrate the differences through the
creation of a second-best model. Section A presents a brief discussion
of the practical, real world concerns that motivate the use of a second-
best model. To keep the analysis accessible, Section B begins with a
discrete example that compares the results from a partial equilibrium
analysis with those from a more general equilibrium analysis. Follow-
ing the example, Section C considers a more general continuum of
goods example. Sections D and E extend the continuum model to
cover the cases of imperfect price discrimination and cases where
price discrimination is present in both markets. Finally, Section F
compares the results from the second-best analysis to those achieved
under a partial equilibrium analysis.
A. Reality and Assumptions: The Practical Concerns that Motivate a
Second-Best Analysis
The move from a partial equilibrium to a second-best analysis
corresponds to a specific factual issue: if an increased ability to price
discriminate leads to the production of more and better copyrighted
For example, there may well be some extremely wealthy consumers who, although they
only listen to a song twice, would nonetheless pay more for those two plays than another,
extremely poor consumer would pay for one hundred plays. Similarly, as between two con-
sumers who both desire only two plays, or who both desire one hundred plays, differences
in income or wealth may create substantial differences in their per-listen reservation value.
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works, where do the necessary resources to produce the additional
works come from? As discussed in Part I, over the long run, there are
two possible answers. First, as the partial equilibrium analysis as-
sumes, the resources might come from sectors of the economy that are
or closely approximate both complete and perfectly competitive mar-
kets. Second, the resources might come from markets that are either
not complete or not perfectly competitive.
If all that was required to justify the use of second-best analysis
was a showing that other markets were either not complete or not per-
fectly competitive, that would be a trivial task. As Herbert Hovenk-
amp has stated: "In the real world, perfect competition is the
exception rather than the rule, and a purist would probably conclude
that perfect competition is nowhere to be found. 6 5 The problem,
however, is not that the partial equilibrium assumptions present an
incomplete picture of real world markets. Models always simplify.
The problem arises instead when differing simplifying assumptions
lead to materially different conclusions. In that case, the assumptions
should be chosen that more accurately reflect likely real world cir-
cumstances.
Applying this general principle, it is far more realistic to assume
that the additional resources needed to produce more and better works
of authorship come from markets that, like the market for copyrighted
works itself, are incomplete and not perfectly competitive, rather than
from those that are complete and perfectly competitive. 66 Given the
level of protection that copyright already provides works of author-
ship, the notion that idle creativity remains underutilized in noncrea-
tive sectors of the economy is unreasonable. 67 When considering a
move from broad copyright with uniform pricing to broad copyright
with price discrimination, the low hanging fruit of systematically un-
65. Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 832
(1990).
66. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
67. As Benjamin Kaplan once warned: "Magnify the [copyright-provided] headstart and
you may conceivably run the risk of attracting too much of the nation's energy into the
copyright-protected sectors of the economy." KAPLAN, supra note 11, at 75. It is hard to
imagine a headstart longer than the one already provided by copyright. As Justice Breyer
noted in his dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the copyright's life-plus-seventy year term is
effectively perpetual:
Regardless, even if this cited testimony were meant more specifically
to tell Congress that somehow, somewhere, some potential author
might be moved by the thought of great-grandchildren receiving
copyright royalties a century hence, so might some potential author
also be moved by the thought of royalties being paid for two centu-
ries, five centuries, 1,000 years, "'til the End of Time." And from a
rational economic perspective the time difference among these peri-
ods makes no real difference. The present extension will produce a
copyright period of protection that, even under conservative assump-
tions, is worth more than 99.8% of protection in perpetuity ....
537 U.S. 186, 255-56 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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deremployed creativity has already been taken. Moreover, my own
sense is that creative people are likely to remain creative however and
wherever they are employed in the economy. If this belief is accurate,
then increasing copyright owners' ability to price discriminate is like-
ly to draw additional creativity from other creative sectors of the
economy. Further, as discussed at the outset, creativity is likely to be
traded within markets that are neither complete nor perfectly competi-
68tive.
When an increased ability to price discriminate leads to incentives
that attract additional creativity into the production of a copyrighted
work, that additional creativity can come either: (1) internally, from
some other creative activity that is also protected by copyright; or (2)
externally, from some other creative activity not protected by copy-
right. For example, an increased ability to price discriminate with re-
spect to feature films may increase the salary that a computer
animation firm can offer computer programmers and thus draw addi-
tional programmers. Those additional programmers must come from
somewhere. But for the offer of higher pay that price discrimination
made possible, those additional programmers might have written
mass-market software for a computer software company or created in-
house analytical software for an investment banking firm.
While all three forms of software receive copyright protection,
there are significant differences in the type of protection copyright
provides and copyright's role in appropriating the marginal social val-
ue each type of software generates. For example, so long as the in-
vestment banking firm keeps the analytical software in-house,
copyright's protection will likely prove to be of very little significance
in appropriating the marginal social value that the software generates.
In contrast, both mass-market software and software that generates
scenes for a feature film rely on a combination of copyright, contrac-
tual restrictions, and technological protection measures to appropriate
their marginal social value. Yet, copyright likely provides signifi-
cantly more extensive protection to scenes in a feature film, as a work
of fiction, than it does to a useful work, such as applications soft-
ware.6 9 Because of a perceived need for greater access, courts for
many years have provided factual or useful works copyright protec-
tion that is less extensive than the protection they have provided fic-
tional or entertaining works. 70 The difference has only become more
68. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
69. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 689-99
(2003) (discussing the evolution of copyright doctrine to emphasize protection of creative
over useful works); see also Lunney, supra note 1I, at 620-27 (demonstrating that provid-
ing more protection to fictional works than to factual works will lead to overinvestment in
fictional works).
70. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 103-04 (1880) (explaining that a
copyright on a useful work was necessarily narrow because it was intended to be used, but
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pronounced since the Supreme Court expressly rejected the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Ser-
vice, Co. 7 1 Whatever justification courts offer for providing less ex-
tensive copyright to useful works, the resulting difference in the
protection's scope leads to a corresponding gap in the ability to ap-
propriate the marginal social value of a computer program that gener-
ates a useful result and one that provides entertainment.
Alternatively, rather than coming from some other copyright-
protected activity, the additional resources necessary to generate more
and better works may come from informal creativity markets that are
left unprotected by formal systems of intellectual property. Despite
the ever-expanding scope of intellectual property, a surprising number
of these informal creativity markets persist. More than a decade ago,
72Jessica Litman identified creative cuisine as one such market. Kal
Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman have identified apparel design as
another.73 And, of course, a number of commentators have pointed to
open source software as another anomalous exception to the seeming
need for the incentives provided by copyright.74
However the cycle of innovation and imitation in the absence of
formal intellectual property protection is far more common than these
few examples suggest. In every aspect of life and business, people
continually develop new and different ways of doing, communicating,
and seeing things. Subsequently, the innovations that prove effective,
the expressions that catch on, and the styles that become popular are
imitated by others. It may be an exaggeration, but only a slight one, to
suggest that all life consists of imitation and innovation.
Even when considering only behavior primarily motivated by fi-
nancial concerns, innovation and imitation are everywhere. Some
people prove successful in their careers and when they do, others imi-
tate them. When I became a professor, I imitated my favorite teachers
and professors, or at least my perceptions of them. I added my own
variations and improvements to what I recalled, as much to reflect my
own personality as to improve my effectiveness as a teacher. I have
then cautioning: "Of course, these observations are not intended to apply to ornamental
designs, or pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may be said, that their
form is their essence, and their object, the production of pleasure in their contemplation.").
71. 499 U.S. 340, 352-61 (1991). For the purpose of determining whether a work is co-
pyrightable or not, the "sweat of the brow" doctrine states that it is not necessary for the
material in question to show originality. Rather, copyright can also cover those works for
which the creator put much effort to compile the factual material. Id. at 352-53.
72. Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 44-
46(1994).
73. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellec-
tual Properly in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687, 1689 (2006).
74. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open
Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002).
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some hope that my students who choose a similar path will imitate
and modify my teaching style.
More generally, lawyers create and advance legal arguments to
support their clients' positions. Some of these arguments become law,
while others simply prove to be effective advocacy techniques.75 In
either case, successful arguments quickly become widely adopted and
imitated by other lawyers.76 One of the most widely shared experi-
ences among first year law firm associates is use of the firm's form
file as a starting point for drafting a complaint, brief, or contract.
Lawyers receive some direct compensation for these innovations, to
the extent that they benefit a specific client, but receive no compensa-
tion for the spillover benefits that their innovations create. Doctors
operate similarly. Physicians develop new surgical techniques and
new diagnosis and treatment protocols. When those techniques prove
successful, they are then taught to, and imitated by, other physicians.
77
Again, payments by clients cover the costs of creating these innova-
tions; yet, doctors are almost entirely uncompensated for the substan-
tial positive externalities these innovations create. In business,
someone created the department store, the grocery store, the super
store, the convenience store, the drive-through, the warehouse store,
the dollar store, the shopping mall, delivery pizza, takeout Chinese,
and the flea market.78 In each case, the innovator received some com-
pensation for her innovation through the successes of her own busi-
75. Melvin Belli, for example, is generally credited with starting the now common prac-
tice of calculating pain and suffering damages on a per diem basis. 3 MELVIN M. BELLI, SR.,
MODERN TRIALS § 55.16, at 779 (2d ed. 1982) ("The jury must be made to appreciate what
pain and suffering is, what ridicule is, what embarrassment is, day by day, hour by hour,
minute by minute, second by second."). While he undoubtedly received some benefits from
his innovation- better cases, perhaps, and certainly, his contingent fee share of the in-
creased pain and suffering awards his clients received - other attorneys who copied Belli's
advocacy technique and their clients also benefited and did so without making any direct
payment to Belli for his innovation.
76. James Boyle presented a similar example at a 2006 conference on software patents.
See David J. Kappos & Ray Strimaitis, Collaborative Innovation and the Patent System -
Replacing Friction with Facilitation 9-10 (Software Info. Ctr. Symposium 2005), available
at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swconf/BM Views On Software Patents.pdf
77. Consider the following example from Professor Adelman's patent law treatise:
Clearly, doctors treating heart patients want to know which patients
are likely to experience serious complications such as ventricular fib-
rillation after a heart attack. Suppose a doctor discovered that certain
heart sounds are associated with a substantial increase in the risk of
ventricular fibrillation. Unless the doctor's discovery can be the basis
for a statutory process or some product such as an automatic device
for detecting such heart sounds, the doctor has made an unpatentable
discovery. Much of the science of medicine is based on such unpat-
entable discoveries.
I MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 1.4[3] (2d ed. 2007).
78. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2729 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("We all benefit freely from ideas, such as that of creating the first
supermarket.").
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ness, but substantial and uncompensated spillover benefits also ex-
isted.
Each of these markets has ways of compensating innovators. In
some, lead time advantages offer an incentive for successful entrepre-
neurs. 79 In others, being a successful innovator offers reputational
advantages that again provide an incentive for innovation.80 In still
others, direct payments from clients cover the cost of the innovation.
Each mechanism described above provides an incentive for inno-
vation precisely because it deviates from the assumptions of the per-
fect competition model. Each innovation also creates substantial and
uncompensated positive externalities. In short, markets for creativity,
wherever they are found in the economy, are neither complete nor
perfectly competitive. To evaluate the welfare effects of implementing
price discrimination in the markets for copyrighted works, it is neces-
sary to determine whether the additional creativity needed to produce
more and better works will: (1) come from other creative sectors of
the economy; or (2) somehow be generated out of the economy's non-
creative sectors that more closely mimic the assumptions of the partial
equilibrium model. A second-best analysis becomes appropriate pre-
cisely to the extent that additional creativity for authorship comes
from other creative sectors.
B. Illustrating the Intuition: A Simplified, Two Good Model with Price
Discrimination
A second-best or more general equilibrium story begins with the
partial equilibrium story often used to illustrate the advantages of
first-degree price discrimination. First consider a producer facing the
step-function inverse demand, shown in Figure 1, who must decide
whether to incur a fixed cost, F, to introduce a product, Good X. For
convenience, the marginal cost for additional units of the good is set
equal to zero, once F is incurred.
79. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299-300 (1970)
(explaining lead time rents as an incentive for authorship); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, I I SuP. CT.
ECON. REV. I, 57-59 (2004) (providing a formal model of lead time rents as an incentive
for innovation).
80. See Lunney, supra note 79, at 59-63 (providing a formal model of reputational rents
as an incentive for innovation).
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If the producer cannot price discriminate, then the profit-
maximizing uniform price to charge is $3.81 At that price, the pro-
ducer will sell four units and earn a conditional producer surplus 82 of
$12. If F is more than $12, then the producer will not introduce the
product. In contrast, if the producer can engage in first-degree price
discrimination, then she will charge each consumer the consumer's
exact reservation price and will earn producer surplus of $21. 83 With
first-degree price discrimination, the producer will introduce Good X
so long as F is less than $21.
The difference between the surplus captured under first-degree
price discrimination and that captured under uniform pricing estab-
lishes a gap between the level of F at which the introduction of Good
X will prove profitable under uniform pricing and the level of F at
which it will prove profitable under first-degree price discrimination.
81. If the producer sets her uniform price equal to $6 per unit, she will sell one unit and
receive $6 in revenue. A uniform price of $5 per unit will achieve sales of two units and
total revenue of $10. With a uniform price of $4, the producer will sell three units and earn
total revenue of $12. With a uniform price of $3, the producer will sell four units and earn
total revenue of $12. With a uniform price of $2, she will sell five units with total revenue
of $10. Thus, for the inverse demand curve shown in Figure I and a marginal cost of zero,
the producer maximizes her profit by setting a uniform price equal to either $4 or $3 per
unit. The model assumes that the producer will sell four units at $3 each in order to maxi-
mize the total surplus available under uniform pricing.
82. The term conditional producer surplus is used to reflect that the producer must pay
the fixed costs of creating the work out of this surplus. It is not therefore pure profit or rent.
For the sake of convenience, all future references to producer surplus should be read as
referring to conditional producer surplus.
83. For the inverse demand curve shown in Figure I with first-degree price discrimina-
tion, the producer will charge the first consumer $6 for the good, the second consumer $5,
the third consumer $4, the fourth consumer $3, the fifth consumer $2, and the sixth and final
consumer $ 1, for a total revenue of $2 1.
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This gap leads to the possibility that in some cases Good X will not be
produced under uniform pricing, even though its production appears
socially desirable. IfF is $16, then under uniform pricing Good X will
not be produced even though its value to society84 ($18 under uniform
pricing or $21 under first-degree price discrimination) apparently ex-
ceeds the good's costs. In contrast, allowing the producer of Good X
to engage in first-degree price discrimination would enable her to earn
an increased producer surplus, thereby ensuring the introduction of
Good X. Indeed, in a partial equilibrium analysis, first-degree price
discrimination ensures that Good X is introduced in every case where
its value exceeds its costs, apparently guaranteeing an efficient alloca-
tion of resources. The inevitable conclusion that follows from this
analysis is that allowing the producer to engage in first-degree price
discrimination enhances social welfare.
To reach this conclusion, a fixed introduction cost (F) for Good X
and a constant marginal cost are assumed. To recover her fixed costs,
the producer must charge a price in excess of marginal cost. This pric-
ing strategy, however, deviates from the efficiency rule dictated by
the perfect competition model, according to which price must equal
marginal cost. Nevertheless, for private production of the good to oc-
cur, the producer must have some market power, exploited either
through a uniform monopoly price or price discrimination in order to
recover her fixed costs. Yet, once it is assumed that one good has a
fixed introduction cost, it makes little sense to assume, as a partial
equilibrium analysis does, that no other good entails such an introduc-
tion cost. A more general equilibrium analysis assumes that other
goods also have a fixed introduction cost and then examines whether,
and if so how, that changes the conclusion.
Suppose then that there exists a second good, Good Y, that re-
quires the same fixed introduction cost, F; entails no marginal cost to
produce additional units once the good is introduced; and faces the
step-function inverse demand shown in Figure 2.
84. Following the usual practice, value is defined as the area under the demand curve
with first-degree price discrimination or the combination of producer and consumer surplus
under uniform pricing. See, e.g. BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 12, at 451 fig.12.2
(graphically illustrating the producer and consumer surplus under first-degree price dis-
crimination). Thus, under first-degree price discrimination, the value will equal the revenue
($21) to the producer. See supra note 83. Under uniform pricing, the value will equal the
producer surplus ($12, with 4 units sold at $3 each), plus consumer surplus ($6), which is
reflected by the difference between each consumer's reservation price and the uniform price
($3 + $2 + $1), for a total value of$18.
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Under uniform pricing, the producer's profit-maximizing price
for Good Y is $4. At that price, the producer would sell four units of
Good Y and earn a producer surplus of $16. While it is possible to
perform the same sort of partial equilibrium analysis as before, a more
general equilibrium analysis would move from an examination of the
two cases individually to an examination of the two cases together.
Suppose then that the two goods (X and Y) both require the same
fixed input, but there is only a sufficient supply of the fixed input to
produce one of the two goods. As between the two, consumers value
the production of Good Y more highly than Good X because they are
willing to pay more for Good Y. Thus, the fixed input is efficiently
allocated only if allocated to the production of Good Y. Given this
setup, the following three cases explore the efficiency consequences
of first-degree price discrimination.
Case I - Uniform Pricing for Both Goods: First, consider the
case where both goods would be sold under uniform pricing. The
fixed input would be used to produce Good Y, because the expected
producer surplus for Good Y ($16) is higher than the producer surplus
expected for Good X ($12). Accordingly, the producer of Good Y
would offer a higher price for the fixed input than the producer of
Good X. As a result, only Good Y would be produced, achieving the
efficient allocation of the fixed input.
Case 2 - Price Discrimination for Good X Only: Second, con-
sider the case where the available technology or legal rules allow first-
degree price discrimination for Good X, but Good Y continues to be
marketed under uniform pricing. The producer surplus for Good X
[Vol. 21
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under first-degree price discrimination ($21) is higher than the pro-
ducer surplus available for Good Y under uniform pricing ($16). As a
result, the producer of Good X could bid the fixed input away from
the producer of Good Y so that only Good X would be produced. This
allocation of the fixed input would be inefficient and would reduce
social welfare because the combined consumer and producer surplus
would be lower ($21) compared to Case I ($22).85
A more general equilibrium analysis thus suggests a result that di-
rectly contradicts the result reached in a partial equilibrium analysis.
In Case 2, allowing first-degree price discrimination for Good X re-
sults in a net decrease in social welfare. However, as with most sec-
ond-best analyses, the results here can be ambiguous, as Case 3
illustrates.
Case 3 - Price Discrimination for Both Goods: Third, suppose
that under existing laws and marketplace conditions, first-degree price
discrimination already exists in the market for Good X, while uniform
pricing applies to Good Y. If either the legal rules or the technology
available changed so that first-degree price discrimination became
practicable for Good Y, such a change would increase social welfare.
Under first-degree price discrimination for both goods, the producer
surplus for Good Y ($28)86 would be higher than surplus for Good X
($21). The producer of Good Y would therefore be able to bid the
fixed input away from the producer of Good X. As in Case 1, the pro-
ducer of Good Y would obtain the fixed input, Good Y would be pro-
duced, and the fixed input would be efficiently allocated. Thus, social
welfare would increase from $21 to $28 as a result of enabling the
producer of Good Y to engage in first-degree price discrimination.
Moreover, social welfare is higher in this Case ($28) as compared to
that in Case 1 ($22), where the markets for both goods were subject to
uniform pricing.
85. With uniform pricing for Good Y, social welfare equals the producer surplus of $16
(four units sold at a price of $4 each), plus the consumer surplus reflected by the difference
between each consumer's reservation price and the uniform price of $4. As illustrated in
Figure 2, the first consumer has a reservation value of $7 and receives consumer surplus of
$3; the second consumer has a reservation value of $6 and receives consumer surplus of $2;
and the third consumer has a reservation value of $5 and receives consumer surplus of $1.
The total surplus is $22, the sum of the total consumer surplus associated with Good Y
under uniform pricing ($16) plus the total consumer surplus ($6). Under first-degree price
discrimination, the producer sells all units at the applicable reservation price, and social
welfare equals the producer surplus ($21) because the producer fully captures each con-
sumer's reservation value ($6+$5+$4+$3+$2+$1).
86. Again, under first-degree price discrimination, social welfare equals the producer
surplus. For the inverse demand curve shown in Figure 2 for Good Y, the producer would
charge the first consumer $7 for the good, the second consumer $6, the third consumer $5,
the fourth consumer $4, the fifth consumer $3, and the sixth and final consumer $2. The
total revenue (and producer surplus) would be $27.
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Conclusions from the Discrete Model: The discrete two good
model establishes that the seemingly clear desirability of first-degree
price discrimination in a partial equilibrium analysis is not so clear. In
this model, unless all markets can practice first-degree price discrimi-
nation, allowing first-degree price discrimination in some markets can
decrease social welfare. Moreover, if the available technology enables
first-degree price discrimination in only some markets, eliminating
first-degree price discrimination in those markets can increase social
welfare.
As these cases illustrate, a switch to first-degree price discrimina-
tion in any given market has two potentially conflicting efficiency
consequences. On one hand, a switch to first-degree price discrimina-
tion would reduce the deadweight loss associated with uniform pric-
ing and thereby generates an unambiguous increase in social welfare
(the "Deadweight Effect"). On the other hand, a switch to price dis-
crimination also increases the producer surplus associated with the
introduction of a product; this increase in producer surplus has am-
biguous effects on social welfare. While the increased surplus may
ensure the profitability and introduction of one product, use of the
available fixed input to introduce one product will foreclose the pro-
duction of another, potentially more valuable product (the "Allocation
Effect"). As Cases 2 and 3 suggest, when these two effects are com-
bined, a switch to first-degree price discrimination may either increase
or decrease social welfare, depending on the market conditions actu-
ally present.
The conclusions from the second-best analysis thus differ sharply
from those of a partial equilibrium analysis. A partial equilibrium
analysis concludes that, in the absence of transaction costs, first-
degree price discrimination is always welfare-enhancing. However, a
more general equilibrium analysis concludes that the introduction of
first-degree price discrimination in some, but not all markets, can re-
duce social welfare. Specifically, a switch from uniform pricing to
first-degree price discrimination in a given market will reduce social
welfare when the Allocation Effect both reduces social welfare and
outweighs the Deadweight Effect.
C. Extending the Analysis to a Continuum of Goods
Given that the desirability of first-degree price discrimination is
theoretically indeterminate, the next step is to identify those market
conditions that determine when a switch to first-degree price dis-
crimination is likely to reduce social welfare.
To examine this issue, the second-best analysis can be extended
from the discrete, two good case to one involving two industries, X
and Y, each with a continuum of goods that can be produced. In the
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real world, these two industries might represent the production of co-
pyrighted works and the production of creative but not copyrighted
products, or the production of digital works and the production of ana-
log works. The model assumes that both industries require a common
input of which there is a limited supply, such as authorship talents or
creativity more generally. To facilitate a graphical comparison of the
net social welfare effect of shifting the available resources, and hence
production, between the two industries, it is assumed that one unit of
the common input can produce one additional good in either industry.
In addition, the input is assumed to be a constant and fixed cost for the
production of each good within both industries. In either industry, the
producer has monopoly power over each good and may set its price
either through uniform pricing or first-degree price discrimination.
The expected producer surplus associated with any given good can be
used to bid for the available stock of the fixed input. Equilibrium is
reached when the available supply of the common input is fully allo-
cated between the two industries. Thus, the producer surplus associ-
ated with the marginal good in each industry becomes the effective
price for units of the common input.
To conduct the analysis, the goods available for production within
each industry per unit of the fixed input will be ranked according to
three criteria: (1) social welfare (SWpd) and producer surplus (PSpd)
associated with the production of the good under first-degree price
discrimination (which are identical); (2) social welfare (SW) associ-
ated with the good under uniform pricing; and (3) producer surplus
(PS,) associated with the good under uniform pricing. Under first-
degree price discrimination, the producer fully recovers the available
surplus. The model assumes that none of the surplus is converted into
cost. Thus, with first-degree price discrimination, social welfare
equals producer surplus. Uniform pricing imposes some deadweight
loss, reducing the available surplus associated with production of a
good (SW, < SWpa). Uniform pricing also leaves some of the available
surplus in the hands of consumers (PS, < SW, < PSpd). The model
ranks the goods available for production within each industry along a
continuum according to SWpd and assumes a reasonably constant rela-
tionship among PS., SW,, and PSpd across an Industry so that the
ranking of any given product remains consistent across the three crite-
ria.
The analysis begins with four cases: (I) markets in both industries
are monopolistic; (2) markets in both industries are imperfectly com-
petitive; (3) markets for Industry X goods are monopolistic, while
those for Industry Y goods are imperfectly competitive; and (4) mar-
kets for Industry X goods are imperfectly competitive, while those for
Industry Y goods are monopolistic. Each case starts with the assump-
tion that goods in each industry are marketed under uniform pricing,
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and then evaluates the welfare consequences of a switch to first-
degree price discrimination for Industry X goods.
8 7
Case 1 - Monopolistic Markets for Both Industries: First, con-
sider a case where the deadweight loss and the consumer surplus un-
der uniform pricing are identical fractions of a good's social value
under first-degree price discrimination (the good's "full social
value"). Such equality between consumer surplus and deadweight loss
occurs in a monopoly model where the producer faces linear inverse
demand and constant marginal costs. In such a case, under uniform
pricing, the deadweight loss and the consumer surplus each equal ex-
actly one-quarter the good's full social value. What is left constitutes
the producer surplus under uniform pricing and equals exactly one-
half the good's full social value.8 9 Having determined the relationship
between social value, consumer surplus, and producer surplus for each
creative good within an industry, that relationship can be applied
across the continuum of such creative goods for each industry as a
whole.
In analyzing the effects of a switch from uniform pricing to first-
degree price discrimination in Industry X, the analysis focuses on
those portions of each industry's demand for the last units of the fixed
input, which is where competition would occur. Because the producer
surplus of the marginal goods from each industry sets the effective
price of the fixed input, this competition necessarily takes place be-
tween goods of the two industries that have comparable private and
social values. For expositional ease, the model assumes that the utility
of the goods from each industry in this area of competitive overlap
ranges from 0 to 1. The model also assumes that the industries are of
similar size,90 with each having 100 different goods9' available for
production in the area of competitive overlap and a uniform decrease
in utility from good-to-good.
Given these assumptions, it is possible to generate curves reflect-
ing PS,, SW, and SWpd for the continuum of goods available for pro-
duction in each industry, as reflected in Figure 3.
87. For a consideration of the case where markets in Industry Y already employ perfect
price discrimination, see infra Part IlI.E.
88. See Lunney, supra note I1, at 557 n.283.
89. Id
90. This assumption affects the magnitude, but not the sign, of the welfare effects from
the model.
91. While the model expressly quantifies output in terms of additional works of author-
ship, the model also applies if the output increase represents an increased quality in the
works created. Thus, an additional unit of output might represent a whole new work, more
realistic special effects or other improvements to some more basic version of a film.
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In these two figures, SWPd is assumed to be I for the most valu-
able good in each industry and falls to 0 for the least valuable good.
Thus the SWpd curve runs from (0, 1) to (100, 0). Given the assump-
tions regarding a monopoly market for each good, linear inverse de-
mand, and constant marginal costs, the SW for the most valuable
good in each industry is 0.75, reflecting the combination of a producer
surplus equal to one-half of SWp and consumer surplus equal to one-
fourth of SWpd. The SW curve thus runs from (0, 0.75) to (100, 0).
Again, given the assumptions of relatively inefficient markets for the
goods from the two industries, the producer surplus is exactly one-half
of SWpd, and thus, the PS, curve runs from (0, 0.5) to (100, 0).
Under uniform pricing in both industries, the PS, curve effec-
tively represents the inverse demand for the fixed input in each indus-
try. Suppose that there are fifty units of the fixed input available92 and
that they are allocated between the two industries until PS = PSY for
the marginal goods in the two industries. Given this setup, exactly
one-half of the available fixed input will go to the production of In-
dustry X goods and one-half to the production of Industry Y goods.
The resulting social welfare, consisting of combined consumer and
producer surplus, is the area under each SW, curve given the output
levels achieved, as illustrated in Figure 4.
92. 1 have selected the quantity of the fixed input available for two reasons. First, with
fifty units of the fixed input, I will show that under price discrimination in Industry X there
is no Industry Y production, facilitating the comparison of the welfare gains and losses from
price discrimination. Second, although there is no Industry Y production, the condition that,
at the "with price discrimination" equilibrium, PS, = PS' still holds. An infinitesimal in-
crease in the fixed input available would be split between Industries X and Y, and
P = PS' is thus still binding. A reduction in the available supply of fixed input introduces
slack into the constraint, such that at equilibrium PS'> PSr. Thus, the full margins over
which the reallocation occurs is not being considered and the analysis is limited to cases
where Industry Y does not have a sufficient number of desirable goods to compete with
Industry X for the full range of the fixed input available.
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Figure 4: Case I - Allocation of Resources and Social Welfare with
Uniform Pricing in Both Industries
Industry X
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Units of Fixed Input
Industry Y
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If legal or technological changes enable producers of Industry X
goods to engage in first-degree price discrimination, then both the
private and social value associated with the production of each Indus-
try X good will increase. If the fifty units of fixed input are reallo-
cated between the two industries so that, for the marginal goods in
No. 21
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
each, PS = PS , then all available fixed input will be allocated to the
production of Industry X goods. 93 As there will no longer be any In-
dustry Y production, we can focus on Industry X exclusively. Thus,
the social welfare associated with a switch to price discrimination in
Industry X equals the area under the SWpd for Industry X, given the
output achieved, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Case I - Welfare Generated by Industry X Production Fol-
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The fixed input now generates social welfare reflected by the
trapezoid CA'EF. The change in social welfare can be broken into two
components. First, the welfare associated with the preexisting Indus-
try X output increases, as the value of that output expands upward
from AB to A'B'. This increase arises because first-degree price dis-
crimination eliminates the deadweight loss associated with the Indus-
try X output under uniform pricing. As Figure 5 shows, this
Deadweight Effect is positive.
Second, output levels in Industry X increase from D to F on Fig-
ure 5. This generates a second apparent increase in welfare, reflected
by the trapezoid DB'EF. However, in order to supply Industry X with
93. With uniform pricing, the PS available to bid for the creativity necessary to produce
the first Industry Y good is slightly less than 0.5 because producer surplus with uniform
pricing is exactly one-half the good's full social value. The PS available to bid for the same
unit of creativity for the fiftieth Industry X good with perfect price discrimination is equal to
the good's full social value, 0.5.
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the fixed input necessary for this output expansion, Industry Y pro-
duction must be eliminated. A partial equilibrium analysis assumes
that the social loss associated with this elimination equals the price of
the necessary resources, which equals the surplus associated with the
marginal Industry X good produced (point E in Figure 5). While ac-
counting for the loss of Industry Y output reduces the apparent wel-
fare gains from the increased Industry X output, the welfare effects
remain undeniably positive.
By contrast, under a more general equilibrium analysis, the net ef-
fect on welfare from this reallocation of production is negative. This
effect can be shown by comparing the welfare gain from the addi-
tional Industry X production, reflected by the trapezoid DB'EF in Fig-
ure 5, and the welfare loss from the reduced Industry Y production,
reflected by the trapezoid cabd in Figure 4.94 Figure 6 superimposes
the trapezoid cabd onto the trapezoid DB'EF in order to facilitate
comparison of these gains and losses.
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To compare relative gains and losses, PS,, SW,, and PSpd are all
measured per unit of the fixed input. Given this setup, any increase in
Industry X production requires a one-to-one decrease in Industry Y
production, and the bases of the two trapezoids are therefore equal
(cd = DI). The heights of the two trapezoids, ca and DB', are also
equal because PS, for the first Industry Y good equals the PSpa for the
94. Because of the assumed symmetry of the two industries, the trapezoid cabd for Indus-
try Y in Figure 4, supra p. 419, is identical to the trapezoid CABD for Industry X in Figure
4, supra p. 419 and Figure 5, supra p. 420.
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twenty-sixth Industry X good. However, because SW, is a constant
fraction of SWpd, the SW curve is flatter than the SWpd curve, and
therefore b > E. The trapezoid cabd, which reflects the social value of
the lost Industry Y production, is larger than the trapezoid DB'EF,
which reflects the social value of the additional Industry X produc-
tion. As a result, the shift in resources from Industry Y to Industry X
brought about by first-degree price discrimination in Industry X gen-
erates a net welfare loss, reflected by the triangle abE.
While it appears from Figure 6 that the Deadweight Effect, re-
flected by the AA'B'B trapezoid, is likely to outweigh the Allocation
Effect, reflected by the triangle abE, the assumptions are not intended
to yield definitive quantitative answers but simply to provide a quali-
tative sense of the direction and relative magnitudes of the two ef-
fects. As Figure 6 illustrates, reducing the deadweight losses
associated with uniform pricing increases social welfare. Thus, as in
the partial equilibrium analysis, the Deadweight Effect is positive.
However, in sharp contrast to the partial equilibrium result, the addi-
tional Industry X output generated by the switch to first-degree price
discrimination in Industry X is less valuable to society than the Indus-
try Y output it replaced. Thus, the Allocation Effect is negative.
Case 2- Imperfectly Competitive Markets for Both Industries:
Next, consider a case where, for both Industries, the markets for the
individual creative goods are neither monopolistic nor perfectly com-
petitive. Such markets would arise where the available products com-
pete more directly and are more readily substitutable than in Case 1.
The increased competition results in each producer capturing less mo-
nopoly profit; for the same reason, the deadweight losses associated
with each product are also lower. For example, if each good were
marketed under conditions approximating a Coumot duopoly,9' in a
market with linear inverse demand and constant marginal costs, then
the deadweight loss under uniform pricing would equal one-ninth of
the good's full social value (compared to one-fourth of the full social
value under monopoly). 96 The remaining surplus would be split
evenly between producers and consumers, with each receiving four-
ninths of the good's full social value as their respective surplus.
These values can be used to illustrate the consequences of a
switch to first-degree price discrimination in imperfectly competitive
markets.97 Increasing the available supply of the fixed input from 50
95. In a Coumot duopoly, two firms offer identical products with each firm seeking to
maximize its profit by setting the quantity of the good it will produce rather than setting the
price. See MAs-COLELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 387-90.
96. Id. at 391-93 (discussing example 12.C.1: Cournot Duopoly with a Linear Inverse
Demand Function and Constant Returns to Scale).
97. The results obtained do not depend on the precise numerical values for producer sur-
plus and deadweight loss chosen for the Cournot duopoly model. So long as the nature of
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to 55.556 units in order to ensure that the constraint PS4 = PS is
binding at the margins, it is possible to perform the same type of anal-
ysis as in Case 1. First, the relevant PS,, SW,, and SWpa curves for
each industry are generated. Then, the available fixed input between
the two industries is allocated, assuming uniform pricing for the mar-
kets in both. Finally, the welfare consequences of a switch to first-
degree price discrimination in Industry X are determined. Given these
assumptions, at equilibrium all units of the fixed input are allocated to
production in Industry X, which generates the welfare reflected by the
trapezoid CA 'EF in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Case 2 - Welfare Generated by Industry X Production Fol-
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As in Case 1, the welfare consequences of the switch to first-
degree price discrimination in Industry X can be broken into two
components. First, the Deadweight Effect is positive, as reflected by
the upward shift from AB to A 'B'. However, because the markets were
relatively efficient to begin with, the deadweight loss under uniform
pricing was relatively small and consequently, the Deadweight Effect
is smaller than for Case i. Second, the Allocation Effect is negative.
the competition present in the markets is such that the deadweight loss is reduced when
compared to that found in the monopoly considered in Case 1, the increase in social welfare
from the Deadweight Effect will be smaller than in Case I. Similarly, so long as the fraction
of the surplus that consumers receive is larger than in Case 1, the welfare losses from the
Allocation Effect will be larger than those found in Case I.
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Figure 8 shows the Allocation Effect by superimposing the welfare
losses due to reduced Industry Y output onto the welfare gains due to
increased Industry X output.
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The Allocation Effect is negative, as in Case 1. In this case, both
a > B' (0.8889 > 0.7200) and b > E (0.6420 > 0.4444). 8 The welfare
loss due to the shutdown of Industry Y is larger than the welfare gain
due to increased Industry X output, and the net social loss from the
reallocation of resources from Industry Y to Industry X is reflected in
the trapezoid B'abE. Compared to Case 1, the Allocation Effect here
is much larger in magnitude.
98. Given the production function assumed, resources are transferred from Industry Y to
Industry X on a one-to-one basis. Determining the net change in social welfare would ordi-
narily involve calculating the social welfare lost from eliminating production in Industry Y,
which would equal the trapezoid CABD in Figure 7, supra p. 423. However, graphically
comparing the net welfare change from switching resources from Industry Y to Industry X
requires calculating A (or a, which is equal to A in this case) and B. With uniform pricing in
Industry Y, the marginal social value of the very first unit of Industry Y production is the
value of SW, at zero units of production (0.8889, at point a). With uniform pricing in both
industries, the marginal social value of the very last unit of Industry Y production is the
value of SW. at 27.7778 units of production. Because SW. is a straight line, running from
0.8889 to 0, it is possible to calculate the value of SW. at 27.7778 units with the formula
0.8889 * (1 - 0.27778). Thus, the marginal social value of Industry Y's last unit of produc-
tion is 0.641975, at b. In contrast, the social value gained by switching these resources to
Industry X follows the SW, line from the point at which additional production begins
(27.7778 units), where the marginal social value is I * (1 - 0.2778), or 0.7222 at B', and
continuing out to the last unit of production (55.5556 units), where the social value is I
(I - 0.5556), or 0.4444, at E.
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Once again, the results differ sharply from those of a partial equi-
librium analysis. While the Deadweight Effect remains positive, Fig-
ure 8 shows that the Allocation Effect is not positive, as partial
equilibrium analysis suggests, but negative, and strongly so.
Case 3 - Industry X Monopolistic, Industry Y Imperfectly Com-
petitive: For the third case, consider a scenario where the markets for
each individual Industry X good are monopolistic as in Case 1, while
those for each Industry Y good are imperfectly competitive as in Case
2. Under uniform pricing, because this model has expressly aban-
doned symmetry, the available fixed input will not necessarily be di-
vided evenly between the two industries. Thus, the first step is to
examine how an available supply of 55.556 units (to ensure that
PS = PS binds at the margins) will be allocated assuming uniform
pricing for both industries. The results are presented in Figure 9.
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
Figure 9: Case 3 - The Allocation of Resources and Social Welfare
with Uniform Pricing Given Monopolistic Industry X Markets and
Imperfectly Competitive Industry Y Markets
Industry X
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Industry Y
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As Figure 9 illustrates, a producer recovers a higher fraction of
the total social value of a good in the monopolistic Industry X, where
PS = (0.5) * SWpd, and a lower fraction in the imperfectly competi-
tive Industry Y, where PS = (0.4444) * SWpd. As a result, if available
resources are allocated so that PS4 = PS for the marginal good in
each industry, then two consequences follow. First, to satisfy
PS4 = PS for the marginal goods across the two industries, more of
the fixed input must be allocated to Industry X than to Industry Y.
Second, if PS4 = PS, then given the respective relationship between
PS, and SW, for each industry, SWA = (0.8889) * SW" for the mar-
ginal goods. In other words, at the margins and with uniform pricing,
the allocation of the fixed input is distorted, resulting in too little pro-
duction for Industry Y.
Given this initial allocation of the fixed input, it is now possible
to consider the welfare consequences of a switch to first-degree price
discrimination in Industry X. As in Cases I and 2, such a switch will
lead at equilibrium to a shutdown of Industry Y and to the allocation
of the available fixed input completely to Industry X production. The
welfare consequences for Industry X are reflected in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Case 3 - Welfare Generated by Industry X Production
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As in the previous cases, the switch to price discrimination in In-
dustry X generates total social welfare reflected by the trapezoid
CA'EF. The Deadweight Effect is positive, due to the upward shift of
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utility from AB to A'B'. Moreover, because of the relatively large
deadweight loss associated with Industry X goods under uniform pric-
ing, the Deadweight Effect is strongly positive. On the other hand, the
Allocation Effect remains strongly negative. Figure II superimposes
the welfare losses from reduced Industry Y output on the welfare
gains from increased Industry X output to obtain a clearer picture of
the net welfare effects.
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As in Case 2, both a > B' (0.8889 > 0.6797) and b > E (0.6797 >
0.4444). Thus, the Allocation Effect is again strongly negative, with
the net welfare loss from the reallocation of resources reflected by the
trapezoid B'abE. In this Case, the Allocation Effect is strongly nega-
tive partly because of a preexisting distortion in the market.
This preexisting distortion arises because of the initial assump-
tions about the nature of the markets and pricing scheme. To under-
stand the distortion, recall that the common resource - creativity -
is allocated efficiently only if the marginal social values associated
with the marginal goods in Industry X and Industry Y are equal. If
there is an unproduced Industry X good with a marginal social value
higher than the last (or marginal) Industry Y good being produced,
then shifting creativity from that Industry Y good to the higher valued
Industry X good will necessarily improve social welfare, and vice
versa. However, in private markets, the common resource between
Industry X and Y is allocated by price, which is set by the fraction of
a good's social value captured as producer surplus.
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Given uniform pricing, monopolistic markets in Industry X, and
imperfectly competitive markets in Industry Y, producer surplus for
goods in Industry Y equaled one-half of the good's marginal social
value. In contrast, for Industry X, producer surplus equaled two-thirds
of the good's marginal social value. As a result, at equilibrium, when
PS4 = PS for the marginal good from each industry, the social value
of the marginal Industry X good is less than that of the marginal In-
dustry Y good (SW4 = 1.5 *PS < 2 *PS= * PS' = SIj).
In other words, Case 3 corresponds to a situation where Industry
Y is producing too little output compared to the social ideal under
uniform pricing. Allowing price discrimination in Industry X exacer-
bates this preexisting distortion, creating a double distortion that in-
creases the magnitude of the welfare loss due to the Allocation Effect.
As in Cases I and 2, the results differ sharply from those of a par-
tial equilibrium analysis with respect to the welfare consequences of
the Allocation Effect. While the Deadweight Effect increases social
welfare, the additional Industry X output generated by price discrimi-
nation is worth less to society than the Industry Y output it displaces.
As a result, the additional Industry X output continues to represent a
net welfare loss, and contrary to the partial equilibrium conclusion,
the Allocation Effect remains strongly negative.
Case 4- Industry X Imperfectly Competitive, Industry Y Mo-
nopolistic: The final Case involves a scenario in which the markets for
individual Industry X goods are imperfectly competitive, while those
for the individual Industry Y goods are monopolistic. These assump-
tions are simply the reverse of those in Case 3. The available supply
of 55.5556 units of the fixed input are allocated between the two in-
dustries in this Case as shown in Figure 9, except that Industry X now
represents Industry Y and vice versa.
As in Case 3, under uniform pricing and with PS' = PS' for the
marginal goods in each industry, more of the fixed input will be allo-
cated to the monopolistic industry in order to achieve equilibrium. In
this case, that means Industry Y output will be higher than Industry X
output. The new relationship between PSu and SWu for each industry is
given by SW = (1.3333) * S'3 for the marginal goods. As a result,
the allocation of the fixed input is distorted, with too much production
in Industry Y.
If first-degree price discrimination is introduced in Industry X,
the switch will lead, at equilibrium, to a shutdown of Industry Y and
the allocation of the available fixed input to Industry X. Figure 12
shows the resulting welfare consequences for Industry X.
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Figure 12: Case 4 - Welfare Generated by Industry X Production
Following a Switch to First-Degree Price Discrimination
Industry X
0 25 50 75 100
Units of Fixed Input
This switch to price discrimination in Industry X generates total
social welfare reflected by the trapezoid CA 'EF. The Deadweight Ef-
fect is positive, as illustrated by the upward shift of the value associ-
ated with the preexisting production levels from AB to A'B'. However,
because the Industry X markets were imperfectly competitive rather
than monopolistic, the Deadweight Effect is relatively small. The Al-
location Effect, however, remains slightly negative. As before, it is
possible to superimpose the welfare losses from reduced Industry Y
output on the welfare gains from increased Industry X output to obtain
a clearer picture of the net welfare effects, as shown in Figure 13.
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Initially, because too little Industry X output was achieved under
uniform pricing, transferring some of the fixed input from Industry Y
production to Industry X production actually increases social welfare,
thus B'> a (0.7647 > 0.7500). However, price discrimination over-
corrects this initial distortion and leads to an overproduction in Indus-
try X, thus E < b (0.4444 < 0.5098). Moreover, because B'E and ab
are linear, and because the net welfare gain at one end (reflected by
the difference between B' and a) is smaller than the net welfare loss at
the other (reflected by the difference between E and b), the Allocation
Effect (trapezoid aB'bE) is slightly negative.
As a result, Case 4 comes closest to duplicating the conclusions
from the partial equilibrium analysis. Here, price discrimination can
help correct the underproduction of Industry X output that would oth-
erwise occur with uniform pricing. Therefore, instituting a price dis-
crimination scheme that shifts resources from Industry Y to Industry
X is initially desirable. However, price discrimination overcorrects for
this initial distortion to such a degree that it introduces a new, more
severe distortion - overproduction in Industry X. As a result, con-
trary to the partial equilibrium conclusion, the Allocation Effect re-
mains slightly negative even in this Case. Similarly, the Deadweight
Effect is positive in this case as well, but only slightly because the
markets for Industry X goods were relatively efficient.
Conclusions from the Continuum Model: The results from these
four cases can be summarized as follows:
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Table 1: Summary of Allocation and Deadweight Effects of Switch




AE: Strongly AE: Slightly
Imperfectly Negative Negative
Competitive DE: Slightly DE: Slightly
Positive Positive
AE: Strongly AE: Slightly
Negative Negative
Monopolistic
DE: Strongly DE: Strongly
Positive Positive
AE: Allocation Effect DE: Deadweight Effect
As with the discrete model, the conclusions from the continuum
model differ sharply from those of a partial equilibrium analysis.
These cases show that a switch to first-degree price discrimination in
any given market will not necessarily enhance social welfare and may
in fact reduce it. The outcome depends on the relative magnitudes of
the welfare losses from the Allocation Effect and the welfare gains
from the Deadweight Effect. More importantly, and in sharp contrast
to the partial equilibrium results, with the continuum model the Allo-
cation Effect is invariably negative. While a switch to first-degree
price discrimination in Industry X increases the incentives associated
with production and thus leads to increased output, that additional
output is less valuable to society than the Industry Y output it dis-
places. Rather than increase social welfare, the Allocation Effect gen-
erated by price discrimination imposes a net welfare loss on society.
In addition to establishing that a switch from uniform pricing to
first-degree price discrimination may reduce welfare, the continuum
model further suggests three general guides for evaluating the likely
welfare consequences of such a switch. First, although the results de-
rived from the continuum model are only qualitative, they suggest that
a switch to first-degree price discrimination in an industry is likely to
prove welfare-enhancing only to the extent that the price discrimina-
tion scheme substantially reduces a deadweight loss otherwise pre-
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sent. The price discrimination scheme must not only reduce the dead-
weight loss, but must reduce it sufficiently to outweigh the utility lost
due to the Allocation Effect, which is invariably negative.
Second, the continuum model also demonstrates that the partial
equilibrium analysis errs in attributing a net welfare gain to the in-
creased production caused by first-degree price discrimination. Rather
than generate an unambiguous increase in social welfare, the contin-
uum model shows that increased production from price discrimination
in a particular industry yields a net reduction in social welfare in
every one of the four cases. If it were possible to obtain the necessary
resources to increase one industry's output at no net social cost, as the
partial equilibrium analysis implicitly assumes, then the imposition of
a price discrimination scheme would increase that industry's output
99
and would generate a clear social benefit. However, once the apparent
gains from increased Industry X output are netted out against the
losses due to reduced Industry Y output, the Allocation Effect is nega-
tive in all cases. In more practical terms, this suggests that if a product
cannot successfully attract the resources necessary for its creation un-
der a uniform pricing rule, it should not be produced under a price
discrimination scheme. Changing the legal or regulatory framework to
allow first-degree price discrimination in some markets will enable
less socially valuable products in those markets to draw resources
away from other, more highly valued products elsewhere in the econ-
omy.
Third, once it becomes clear that the Allocation Effect is likely to
prove negative, the costs of implementing a price discrimination
scheme become a central issue. Despite the fact that the Deadweight
Effect is positive in all cases, the negative impact of the Allocation
Effect may, even in Case I, lower the benefit of implementing a price
discrimination scheme. This is most apparent in Cases 3 and 4, where
the Allocation and Deadweight Effects appear to balance each other
almost exactly. If the switch to a price discrimination scheme entails
any significant transaction costs, that cost increase may prove suffi-
cient to tip the balance towards a net welfare loss. Additionally, given
that the Allocation Effect is invariably negative, the assurance that the
value added through the creation of additional works of authorship, or
by improving the quality of existing works, will necessarily cover the
costs of implementing a price discrimination scheme is no longer per-
suasive.t
°°
99. It should be clear from the discussion that this Article focuses on output as the vari-
ety, number, or quality of creative goods from an industry, rather than output as the quantity
of any particular good.
100. See Lunney, supra note 44, at 887.
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D. Extending the Framework to Encompass Imperfect Price
Discrimination
Even with the advent of interactive digital distribution, perfect or
first-degree price discrimination probably remains unachievable. In-
teractive digital distribution may make complex licensing arrange-
ments possible, where prices are apportioned for any number of
specific uses. However, such license agreements will almost certainly
remain imperfect at identifying each consumer's precise reservation
value for each use. Existing partial equilibrium analyses by Katz, Ro-
berts and Varian have already demonstrated that such imperfect
(whether second- or third-degree) price discrimination schemes may
reduce social welfare.' The graphical approach presented here may
be adapted to incorporate these analyses, extend them to consider the
welfare effects from increasing one industry's output (in terms of
product variety), and illustrate that these analyses underestimate the
welfare losses associated with price discrimination.
Existing analysis suggests that a switch from uniform pricing to
price discrimination under monopoly conditions will always increase
producer surplus. 102 Such a switch may, on the other hand, either de-
crease or increase total surplus. Using the two industry continuum of
goods model and the assumptions in Case 1103 the general equilibrium
effects of imperfect price discrimination can be illustrated by consid-
ering two cases - Cases 5 and 6. Both cases assume that, as a result
of a switch to an imperfect price discrimination scheme, Industry X
producers capture a producer surplus that is an increased fraction of
their respective goods' full social value. The cases differ, however, in
that under Case 5, total surplus also increases from 75% of full social
value under uniform pricing to 80% under price discrimination. In
contrast, under Case 6, the switch to price discrimination in Industry
X merely redistributes surplus from consumers and thus neither in-
creases nor decreases the total surplus associated with each good pro-
duced in Industry X.
Given the assumptions of the model, if fifty units of the fixed in-
put are allocated between the two industries and Industry X switches
to imperfect price discrimination, then the resulting increase in pro-
ducer surplus will lead to a reallocation of ten units of the fixed input
from Industry Y to Industry X. In both cases, this reallocation reduces
101. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 8; K.W.S. Roberts, Welfare Considerations of Nonlinear
Pricing, 89 ECON. J. 66 (1979); Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 870 (1985).
102. See supra Part II.A.
103. Case I assumed that the market for each good within an industry is a monopoly
characterized by a linear, downward sloping inverse demand curve and zero marginal cost.
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net social welfare, because the resources would have generated more
surplus if invested in the additional Industry Y goods. However, in
Case 5, where the switch also increases total surplus, the Deadweight
Effect generates an increase in the surplus associated with the preex-
isting production level of Industry X. Whether the increase in total
surplus from the Deadweight Effect will outweigh the loss in surplus
from the Allocation Effect depends on the precise magnitude of the
changes in producer and consumer surplus achieved through the
switch to imperfect price discrimination.
For the assumptions set forth for Case 5, the welfare effects are
summarized in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Case 5 -The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Price Discrimi-
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As in Cases I through 4, the second-best model graphically iso-
lates the Deadweight and Allocation Effects. Given the particular as-
sumptions made, Figure 14 suggests that the increase in surplus
associated with the Deadweight Effect will likely outweigh the reduc-
tion in surplus associated with the Allocation Effect, given the par-
ticular assumptions made. However, and contrary to the partial
equilibrium account, the Allocation Effect continues to be negative. A
switch to price discrimination in Industry X increases Industry X out-
put, but the re-allocated fixed input units would have generated more
surplus if used to produce additional Industry Y goods.
In Case 6, where implementing a price discrimination scheme in
Industry X merely redistributes surplus from consumers to the pro-
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ducer, a partial equilibrium analysis suggests that the welfare effects
of implementing such a price discrimination scheme are neutral -
surplus is neither gained nor lost, merely transferred. However, the
second-best analysis demonstrates that implementing price discrimi-
nation in Industry X under these assumptions reduces total surplus, as
shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: Case 6 - The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Price Dis-
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In this case, the only effect is a reduction in total surplus from the
Allocation Effect. In Figure 15, this loss is reflected in trapezoid
BabE. Here, as elsewhere, the Allocation Effect is negative. A switch
to price discrimination in Industry X increases Industry X output, but
the re-allocated fixed input units would have generated more surplus
if used to produce additional Industry Y goods.
E. A Final Case: Perfect Price Discrimination in Both Industries
Before leaving the continuum model, one further case deserves
consideration. In all of the cases presented, this Article assumes that
only one of the creative industries can (legally and technologically)
move to first-degree price discrimination. But what if both of the in-
dustries were able to move to first-degree price discrimination?
There are two situations where this possibility might arise. The
first situation occurs when the markets in both industries are initially
subject to uniform pricing, and a legal or technological change is be-
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ing considered that would allow both industries' markets to move to
first-degree price discrimination - Case 7. In the second situation -
Case 8 - first-degree price discrimination already exists in Industry
Y, and the question is whether Industry X markets should be allowed,
through legal or technological change, to move in that direction as
well.
With respect to Case 7, if it is assumed that each creative good in
both Industry X and Industry Y is traded in an imperfectly competi-
tive market, as set forth in Case 2,1°4 a shift from uniform pricing to
first-degree price discrimination for both industries has the following
effects. First, the shift eliminates the deadweight losses in both indus-
tries and thus increases welfare. The extent of the welfare increase is
shown by the trapezoid AA'B'B in Figure 8.105 Second, there is no Al-
location Effect because no resources are reallocated from Industry X
to Industry Y. Just as in Case I and Case 2 with uniform pricing, the
available resources are distributed evenly between the two industries
if both industries are able to engage in first-degree price discrimina-
tion.
If both industries can move to first-degree price discrimination,
the Allocation Effect is not negative for the first time in the second-
best analysis. Instead, it is zero.
While not negative, the supposed gains from encouraging the pro-
duction of additional works touted by the partial equilibrium story
remain illusory. In this case, there is no Allocation Effect because the
fraction of the full social value captured by producers as surplus is
identical in the two industries, whether the markets rely on uniform106~ 107
pricing, or are subject to first-degree price discrimination. In ei-
ther situation, the available common resource is efficiently allocated
between the two industries. For that reason, a move to first-degree
price discrimination does not reallocate the common resource or lead
to more and better works from Industry X. Consequently, the welfare
effects of switching to first-degree price discrimination in both indus-
tries depend solely on the relative magnitude of the Deadweight Ef-
fect and the transaction costs incurred to implement the price
discrimination scheme.
Case 8, where first-degree price discrimination already exists in
Industry Y, is the first case that duplicates the results of the partial
equilibrium analysis. If Industry Y is already engaging in first-degree
price discrimination and legal or technological changes would allow
104. If both industries are more monopolistic, the Deadweight Effect in each industry
would be somewhat larger, corresponding to the trapezoid AA'B'B in Figure 6, supra p. 421.
The Allocation Effect would remain zero.
105. See Figure 8, supra p. 424.
106. In this case, the producer surplus is one-half the full social value of each good in
Case I, or four-ninths the full social value of each good in Case 2.
107. In this case, the producer surplus is 100% of the full social value of each good.
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Industry X to engage in first-degree price discrimination, the Alloca-
tion Effect would be positive,10 8 precisely as the partial equilibrium
analysis suggests. Thus, if all markets for creativity other than the one
at issue are already able to price discriminate perfectly, then the par-
tial equilibrium analysis would have real world significance. More
realistically, since first-degree price discrimination is only a theoreti-
cal concept, showing that other creative markets are more able to
price discriminate than the market at issue would be sufficient. If this
can be shown, then it becomes plausible that the additional incentives
that allowing more, or more precise, price discrimination in a particu-
lar creative market would generate would likely yield a net increase in
social welfare along the lines that a partial equilibrium analysis would
suggest.'
°9
F. A Comparison of the Partial and More General Equilibrium
Results
In the case where first-degree price discrimination is allowed in
one but not all markets, the partial and the more general equilibrium
models reach fundamentally different conclusions regarding the desir-
ability of first-degree price discrimination in any given market. The
models reach such different conclusions because they rely on funda-
mentally different assumptions regarding the opportunity cost associ-
ated with the production lost in the other markets not engaging in
price discrimination. In particular, a partial equilibrium analysis as-
sumes that all other markets are complete and perfectly competitive.
Given this assumption, there is no gap between social and private val-
ue (or cost) at the margins. Instead, in theory, all benefits and costs
are fully internalized such that for the marginal goods, marginal cost
equals marginal benefit equals price in all markets but those for copy-
righted works. As a result, when resources are drawn away from other
industries to produce more copyrighted works, the price of those re-
sources fully reflects the marginal social value of their other potential
uses. Therefore, the net social opportunity cost of reducing output in
other industries is zero, and the surplus associated with increased pro-
duction of copyrighted works represents a direct increase in social
welfare.
In contrast, a second-best equilibrium analysis expressly assumes
that other markets are also likely to prove imperfect. Just as there is a
gap between private and social value for creative copyrighted works, a
108. In fact, the Allocation Effect would be identical in size to the Allocation Effect
shown for each case in Figures 6, 8, II, and 13, but would be positive. See supra Figure 6,
at p. 421; Figure 8, at p. 424; Figure I1, at p. 428; Figure 13, at p. 431.
109. 1 have explored such an argument as a justification for limited rights to control de-
rivative works and public performances. See Lunney, supra note II, at 628-53.
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second-best analysis assumes that there is likely a gap between the
private and social value for all creative goods, whether copyrighted or
not. This gap is precisely measured by the difference between SW and
PS. In these other industries, a producer can offer a price up to PS,
for the fixed input necessary to ensure a good's creation. However, so
long as uniform pricing (or imperfect price discrimination) leaves
some of the good's available surplus to consumers, that price is less
than the good's marginal social value. As a result, when resources are
drawn away from other creative industries to increase the production
of copyrighted works, the price of those resources does not fully re-
flect the social cost of the reallocation. Consequently, the net social
cost of reducing creative output in non-copyrighted markets is not
zero and this opportunity cost must be taken into account. When this
is done under any realistic set of assumptions, the surplus gained from
increased output of copyrighted works is more than offset by the sur-
plus lost due to reduced output in the creative, but uncopyrighted in-
dustries.
IV. EVALUATION OF EXISTING PRICE DISCRIMINATION
SCHEMES IN COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES
When measured against the conclusions from the more general
equilibrium analysis in Part Ill.F, many of the existing price discrimi-
nation schemes commonly employed in the copyright industries seem
likely to generate significant welfare losses. Generally, existing
schemes seem to do little to reduce deadweight losses and entail sig-
nificant costs to implement. The justification for these schemes relies
heavily on the supposed welfare gain from the creation of more and
better copyrighted works. The second-best analysis suggests that such
price discrimination schemes are precisely those most likely to reduce
social welfare.
Consider again the book publishing and film distribution exam-
pies." 0 In both cases, the price discrimination scheme is unlikely to
reduce deadweight losses significantly. For example, the ability to
offer physically differentiated forms of a novel may slightly reduce
the ultimate price charged for the paperback; however, it will also
force some consumers to wait an additional time before they can pur-
chase the book. As a result, any reduction in deadweight loss associ-
ated with a lower paperback price is largely offset by the long delay in
the paperback's availability.
A price discrimination scheme is also costly to implement, par-
ticularly in the film distribution case, which requires the creation of a
repeatedly redundant distribution system. Therefore, both the book
I 10. See supra Part ll.B.
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publishing and film distribution schemes rely heavily on the assump-
tion that the value added by the more and better works justifies these
costs. Although such a justification is perfectly consistent with a par-
tial equilibrium analysis, it proves to be illusory - a mere reflection
of the flawed opportunity cost assumption inherent in the partial equi-
librium analysis. After more realistic assumptions are employed, the
supposed welfare gain from the creation of additional works becomes
a welfare loss. Price discrimination can increase the incentives avail-
able for any given copyrighted work, and may thereby ensure the pro-
duction of additional books and films. These works are undoubtedly
of some value to society. Yet they are probably of less value than the
alternative uses to which the resources necessary to create them would
otherwise have been devoted.
When we move beyond these traditional analog price discrimina-
tion schemes into the digital world, courts and commentators have
commonly assumed that the Internet, and interactive digital distribu-
tion more generally, will substantially expand the opportunities for
price discrimination."' In analyzing the normative desirability of this
expansion, most have acknowledged the twin advantages of reduced
deadweight loss and increased incentives that the partial equilibrium
analysis assigns to price discrimination. Consider Judge Easterbrook's
enthusiastic embrace of price discrimination in ProCD, Inc. v. Zei-
denberg. " 
2
In that case, ProCD compiled some 3,000 telephone directories
into a single digital database, SelectPhone, which it sold (or perhaps
licensed) in CD form." 3 Zeidenberg purchased (or licensed) a copy of
the database, downloaded the listings from it, and posted them on his
website.1 4 ProCD then sued Zeidenberg, alleging that his use was
commercial and therefore violated a "no commercial use" restriction
in the EULA accompanying the database." 1
5
In deciding whether this provision of the EULA was binding on
Zeidenberg under Wisconsin's version of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, Judge Easterbrook began his analysis not with the
applicable legal rules, but with a parable about price discrimination:
The database in SelectPhone[] cost more than $10
million to compile and is expensive to keep current.
It is much more valuable to some users than to oth-
ers.... [So] ProCD decided to engage in price dis-
crimination, selling its database to the general public
I II. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 4, at 1234-40; Meurer, supra note 8, at 876.
112. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
113. Id. at 1449.
114. Id. at 1449-50.
115. Id.
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for personal use at a low price (approximately $150
for the set of five discs) while selling information to
the trade for a higher price....
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a
profit by charging a single price - that is, if it could
not charge more to commercial users than to the
general public - it would have to raise the price
substantially over $150. The ensuing reduction in
sales would harm consumers who value the informa-
tion at, say, $200. They get consumer surplus of $50
under the current arrangement but would cease to
buy if the price rose substantially. If because of high
elasticity of demand in the consumer segment of the
market the only way to make a profit turned out to be
a price attractive to commercial users alone, then all
consumers would lose out - and so would the
commercial clients, who would have to pay more for
the listings because ProCD could not obtain any con-
tribution toward costs from the consumer market.
To make price discrimination work, however, the
seller must be able to control arbitrage....
Instead of tinkering with the product and letting us-
ers sort themselves - for example, furnishing cur-
rent data at a high price that would be attractive only
to commercial customers, and two-year-old data at a
low price - ProCD turned to the institution of con-
tract. Every box containing its consumer product de-
clares that the software comes with restrictions stated
in an enclosed license. This license, which is en-
coded on the CD-ROM disks as well as printed in the
manual, and which appears on a user's screen every
time the software runs, limits use of the application
program and listings to non-commercial purposes.
116
This price discrimination parable was a curious place to begin for
a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that price discrimination
does not seem to have been ProCD's purpose in seeking to enforce its
commercial use restriction against Zeidenberg. 117 Nonetheless, Judge
116. Id. at 1449-50.
117. As Michael Meurer has noted, ProCD's lawsuit was not filed to maintain its ability
to price discriminate, but to stop the defendant Zeidenberg from posting the telephone list-
ings on a website and thus enabling ProCD's consumers to obtain the product from Zeiden-
No. 2]
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
Easterbrook saw ProCD's contractual commercial use restriction as an
effort to enable price discrimination and, firmly believing in the desir-
ability of such price discrimination, enforced the license provision. 18
That doing so required both a new interpretation of legal rules govern-
ing contract formation and a narrowing of copyright's preemption
doctrine 119 proved no impediment to Judge Easterbrook in his zeal to
ensure ProCD's ability to price discriminate.
Yet, moving from the partial equilibrium conclusions regarding
price discrimination to the more general equilibrium results makes the
desirability of the supposed price discrimination scheme in ProCD v.
Zeidenberg questionable at best. As with more traditional price dis-
crimination schemes, the reduction in deadweight loss achieved by
ProCD's attempt to price discriminate was likely small (assuming that
price discrimination was ProCD's goal). Certainly, it is possible, as
Judge Easterbrook speculated, that if ProCD were unable to enforce
its license it might sell only to commercial users at a high price.
20
Yet, based on the facts available, it appears just as likely that ProCD
would have sold to everyone at the low, ordinary consumer rate.
Moreover, if the deadweight losses from ProCD's pricing scheme are
objectionable, such losses could be avoided entirely by refusing to
enforce the license. This refusal would allow Zeidenberg to make his
copy of the ProCD telephone directory available to everyone at the
low, ordinary consumer price.
Certainly, as Professor Richard Epstein has speculated, it is also
possible that ProCD could not have recovered its investment without
being able to price discriminate between commercial and personal use
markets. However, there is no evidence to support this speculation.
berg rather than ProCD. Whether Zeidenberg intended to make a profit from his website or
merely posted the information for his own amusement had no bearing on ProCD's motiva-
tion for the suit. See Meurer, supra note 9, at 78 n.83.
118. See id.
119. With respect to the preemption issue, Judge Easterbrook reasoned that the contrac-
tual restriction was not "equivalent" to copyright within the meaning of copyright's express
preemption provision, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000), because "[a] copyright is a right against
the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as
they please, so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights."' ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454. Of
course, as Judge Easterbrook had already noted, the commercial use restriction appeared on
the screen every time the software ran. Id. at 1450. If this message bound every consumer
who used the software after seeing this restriction, just as Judge Easterbrook bound Zeiden-
berg, then ProCD's commercial use restriction would be a "right against the world" every
bit as much as copyright is. Moreover, the statutory preemption standard requires the court
to ask whether the state law right is "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright," rather than whether the state law in question is "equivalent to
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). Here, the actual contract term at issue prohibited the copy-
ing of the database. Epstein, supra note 2, at 98. A state law right to prohibit reproduction
was not only equivalent to, but identical to, one "of the exclusive rights" within the general
scope of copyright - the reproduction right. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
120. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
121. Epstein, supra note 2, at 105 (noting that "any additional revenue from low-intensity
users could make the difference between a profitable and a failing venture, so that limiting
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More importantly, Epstein's assertion suffers from the same flawed
assumption about opportunity cost to which partial equilibrium analy-
sis inevitably leads. This fallacy emphasizes what society has to gain
if ProCD invests in its SelectPhone database - the database itself and
its corresponding social value - and by negative implication, what
society has to lose if price discrimination is not permitted. However,
such an analysis omits any consideration of what that $10 million' 22
would otherwise have bought for society. After all, if the resources are
not invested in this database, they will be invested elsewhere, in some
other productive endeavor. As the second-best analysis demonstrates,
if price discrimination is necessary to make a particular investment
attractive, that is usually because those resources would be more valu-
able to society if used elsewhere.
Generalizing from the facts of ProCD v. Zeidenberg to price dis-
crimination more generally yields similar conclusions. With respect to
the first supposed advantage of price discrimination, it is unlikely that
switching to price discrimination will significantly reduce the dead-
weight loss otherwise associated with a copyrighted work. For most
works, copyright likely leads to markets that function more similarly
to imperfectly competitive markets among differentiated products
than to markets that function as pure monopolies.123 As a result, the
deadweight losses associated with uniform pricing are likely to be
relatively small in most cases in any event. Moreover, numerous so-
cial institutions, such as libraries and video rental stores, minimize the
deadweight losses uniform pricing might otherwise impose.' 24 As
ProCD v. Zeidenberg demonstrates, if excessive deadweight losses
are truly problematic, they could be eliminated by narrowing or ad-
justing copyright law accordingly. For example, if a book publisher
chooses to issue a hardcover of a new novel, copyright law could be
amended or interpreted so that a paperback issued simultaneously
would be considered non-infringing. This would avoid the deadweight
loss that issuing a hardcover alone would otherwise generate.
the seller to high-intensity customers reduces the likelihood that a venture will get off the
ground in the first place").
122. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
123. For example, Landes and Posner have asserted in a single article both that
"[c]opyrights ... rarely confer monopoly power" and that "we maintain throughout our
analysis the assumption of a downward-sloping demand curve for copies of a given work."
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Laiv, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 n.4, 361 (1989). Professor Kitch has identified this inconsistency as
the type of mistake often made in economic analysis of intellectual property issues. Edmund
W. Kitch, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1734-35 (2000). Rather than read these two statements
as a fatal contradiction, perhaps Landes and Posner were merely suggesting that copyright
protection does not afford a copyright owner a full monopoly, even if it grants a copyright
owner some ability to price in excess of marginal cost. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright
and Price Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 218 (2004) (stating that "substitutes are
readily available for most works").
124. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 1812-13.
No. 2]
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
The purported efficiency gains from increasing the producer sur-
plus associated with any given copyrighted work - price discrimina-
tion's second supposed advantage - are simply an illusion. Once the
unrealistic assumptions behind partial equilibrium analysis are aban-
doned, the trade-offs created by allowing price discrimination in one
sector of the economy are apparent. Price discrimination for books
and films may result in more books and films, but the resources used
to produce them cannot then be used for other purposes. Thus, more
price discrimination for copyrighted works may mean more of those
works, but it also necessarily means less of something else. Once the
unrealistic assumption that all other markets are complete and per-
fectly competitive is abandoned and a more realistic set of assump-
tions is embraced, the most reasonable conclusion is that the
additional works of authorship generated by price discrimination are
likely to prove less valuable to society than the uses to which the re-
sources would otherwise have been devoted.
Finally, even in the digital world, price discrimination schemes
are likely to prove expensive to implement. Although physically dif-
ferentiated products are not strictly required in a digital environ-
ment, 125 producers still need to monitor and police consumers' use of
their works to ensure the desired market separation. In some cases,
monitoring and policing may be relatively easy, as in ProCD v. Zei-
denberg where the defendant Zeidenberg posted the ProCD database
on the Internet and offered the database to his subscribers. 126 In other
cases, policing consumer use may prove extremely difficult, as in a
case where an individual uses the ProCD database to look up a tele-
phone listing for a business call, but does so in the privacy of her of-
fice. Even the most sophisticated DRM system could not determine
the purpose, whether personal or professional, behind a consumer's
use of the database in such a case.
In short, price discrimination schemes for copyrighted works,
whether in the analog or digital world, are unlikely to advance social
welfare. To the contrary, by transferring what would otherwise be
consumer surplus to producers, price discrimination schemes will at-
tract too much creativity and other scarce resources into the produc-
tion of copyrighted works, and thereby generate a net reduction in
social welfare. This suggests that copyright doctrine should be ad-
justed accordingly by giving broader scope to those aspects of copy-
right that can limit copyright owners' ability to price discriminate,
1 27
125. For example, in one early attempt at price discrimination in a digital environment, a
computer manufacturer offered the same version of a computer to all of its consumers, but
then required the consumers to pay an additional fee for the software necessary to unlock
features built into the computer. See Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Mgmt. Assistance, Inc.,
No. 81-1295, 1983 WL 1130, at *1-4 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983).
126. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
127. This includes the fair use, first sale, and preemption doctrines.
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while giving a narrower scope to those aspects that promote price dis-
crimination.
For example, while concerns over unauthorized copying may jus-
tify a limit on the first sale doctrine,128 expanding the ability to price
discriminate cannot provide such a justification. Because the welfare
effect from allowing price discrimination will likely prove negative,
courts and regulators should undertake a balancing test before acting
to limit the availability and applicability of the first sale doctrine in
the digital environment. This test would balance any welfare gains
from limiting unauthorized copying against the welfare loss that will
likely result from expanding opportunities to price discriminate. Simi-
larly, even if it became practicable to enforce, Congress should not
amend the Copyright Act to expressly incorporate a right of private
performance. 29 Recognizing a right of private performance would be
undesirable precisely because it enhances the ability of copyright
owners to price discriminate. For the same reasons, courts should read
copyright's fair use and preemption doctrines broadly enough to pre-
vent a copyright owner from implementing such a right through con-
tract and technological means.
V. MORE GENERAL SECOND-BEST IMPLICATIONS
This Article highlights several important issues. As noted previ-
ously, assumptions are critical in economic analyses, and second-best
analysis is messy. Absent detailed information about the markets at
issue, second-best models can generate frustratingly ambiguous,
"maybe yes, maybe no" answers. This ambiguity contrasts sharply
with the usually simple and clear conclusions reached using first-best
or partial equilibrium analysis. Unfortunately, as this Article illus-
trates, partial equilibrium's simple clarity can come at the expense of
accuracy. This is not to say that partial equilibrium analysis does not
have its uses. All models, economic or otherwise, must necessarily
simplify the real world situation they examine. But simplifying re-
quires assumptions; as this analysis of price discrimination has dem-
onstrated, sometimes the failure to recognize the significance of a
choice between different simplifying assumptions can lead to material
errors.
When assumptions control conclusions, the assumptions neces-
sary for the conclusions must be defensible. This Article's price dis-
crimination analysis rests on two starting assumptions: (I) markets for
copyrighted works likely function more as a form of imperfect or mo-
128. As discussed, Congress has limited the scope of the first sale doctrine for copy-
righted sound recordings and computer programs. See supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
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nopolistic competition, rather than as pure monopolies; and (2) the
additional creativity needed to produce more and better works of au-
thorship likely comes from other creative sectors. These assumptions
are ultimately empirical propositions that can be tested and proven by
reference to real world markets. For now, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that additional authorship will come from other creative
fields- fields that also generate positive externalities, fields where
imitation and copying are common, and fields where the markets are
neither complete nor perfectly competitive- rather than from non-
creative fields that come closer to the assumptions of the partial equi-
librium model.
To some extent, second-best analysis is useful precisely because
it generates ambiguities. As the various cases set forth in this Article
suggest, second-best analysis inevitably produces conclusions along
the lines of "if this is true, then the welfare consequences of this
change are x," but "if something else is true, then the welfare conse-
quences are y." By tying particular conclusions to particular assump-
tions and by making those assumptions explicit, second-best analysis
focuses attention on the key issue of which set of assumptions most
accurately reflects the real world.
In contrast, partial equilibrium analysis tends to conceal its neces-
sary assumptions. For example, when Landes and Posner used a par-
tial equilibrium model to analyze copyright, they never explained the
underlying assumptions essential to partial equilibrium analysis.
130
Perhaps, they expected that every reader would be familiar with the
underlying assumptions. Since they never expressly stated the as-
sumption that the additional resources needed to create more and bet-
ter works of authorship were coming from complete and perfectly
competitive (and therefore, necessarily uncreative) sectors of the
economy, some readers may have remained unaware of that essential
assumption. Moreover, because they never stated it, the authors never
had to defend the assumption, nor did they have to explain how it af-
fects their various conclusions. This lack of transparency is not unique
to Landes and Posner, but ubiquitous to law and economic analyses
that rely on partial equilibrium models.' 3 Everyone knows the saying
"garbage in, garbage out." Unfortunately, partial equilibrium analysis
tends to hide the "garbage in," making it harder to recognize the gar-
bage coming out.
In addition to the importance of making assumptions both explicit
and accurate, the second-best analysis of price discrimination also
reminds us that the ability to pay more for creativity as a common
resource does not reliably indicate a correspondingly higher social
value. This increased ability to pay could reflect a higher social value,
130. See Landes & Posner, supra note 123, at 333-44.
131. See Kitch, supra note 123, at 1734-35.
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but it could also mean that one use captures a larger share of its asso-
ciated marginal social value in the form of producer surplus. Being a
popular author may pay significantly more than being a great teacher,
but that does not indicate which activity creates a higher marginal
social value. The higher pay simply indicates which activity has more
complete markets surrounding it and is therefore better able to
monetize the social value created.
The markets with which copyright surrounds works of authorship
are not complete and hence do not ensure that a rights holder captures
all of the marginal social value of his work. Such perfect appropriabil-
ity is unobtainable and is theoretically ideal only under a set of im-
plausible assumptions.' 32 If the copyright industry competes for the
resources necessary to create more and better works primarily with
other creative sectors of the economy, then the key to optimal re-
source allocation is not perfect appropriability, but relative appropri-
ability- just as the issue elsewhere is not externality, but relative
externality, or is not free riding, but disproportionate free riding.'
33
From an efficiency perspective, copyright reaches its optimal scope
when it ensures that the creativity invested in copyrighted works
roughly captures as much of the associated marginal social value as
do competing uses of the creativity. Capturing any more will result in
too much creativity being devoted to the production of copyrighted
works and too little being left for other creative sectors of the econ-
omy.
132. Professor Wagner recognizes the inevitable fact of incomplete appropriability:
Notwithstanding efforts to the contrary, information cannot truly be
controlled, at least not in the way that the control-critics suggest. That
is, the "fencing" of information is a remarkably futile proposition; the
control we offer owners of intellectual property rights is simply not
the control we offer landowners. It should not be, but more impor-
tantly, it cannot be.
R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies
of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 995, 999 (2003). However, in his subsequent analysis,
Professor Wagner entirely misses the normative implications of incomplete appropriability
in his subsequent analysis. Id. at 1017-24 (using both a partial equilibrium analysis and one
that ignores uniformity costs to model the costs and benefits of expanded intellectual prop-
erty rights).
133. In his dissent in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705
(2007), Justice Breyer takes a key step towards recognizing that the analogous efficiency
question with respect to free riders is best answered not by asking whether there is any
degree of free riding, but by asking whether there is disproportionate free riding in a particu-
lar context. Breyer states:
There is a consensus in the literature that "free riding" takes place.
But "free riding" often takes place in the economy without any legal
effort to stop it. Many visitors to California take free rides on the Pa-
cific Coast Highway. We all benefit freely from ideas, such as that of
creating the first supermarket. Dealers often take a "free ride" on in-
vestments that others have made in building a product's name and
reputation. The question is how often the "free riding" problem is se-
rious enough significantly to deter dealer investment.
Id. at 2729.
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Compared to the markets which surround other creative invest-
ments, the rights associated with copyright already ensure more com-
plete markets for the creativity embodied in works of authorship. The
rights copyright provides are both extremely broad and absurdly
long,134 protecting against essentially every unauthorized use of the
work that makes, or could make, money.' 35 While there are exceptions
to copyright's broad scope, such as the idea-expression dichotomy
and the fair use doctrine, the resulting markets surrounding copy-
righted works are far more complete than those surrounding other
creative investments. As a result, copyright's existing scope has prob-
ably already led to the overproduction of copyrighted works.
Legal or technological change that enables copyright owners to
price discriminate either more often or more perfectly will only exac-
erbate this overproduction problem. An increased ability to price dis-
criminate will increase producer surplus for any given work, increase
the incentives for the production of copyrighted works, and thereby
attract even more creativity to the production of copyrighted works.
This increase does not indicate that such additional works are the
more valuable use of the resources. Rather, it merely indicates that
copyright enables the rights holder to capture a larger fraction of the
resulting marginal social value for works of authorship than for the
competing creative but uncopyrighted uses. As a result, the additional
incentives that price discrimination provides compared to uniform
pricing may lead to more and better works, but producing these works
will generate a net welfare loss for society as a whole. But for the
price discrimination, the resources necessary to produce them would
have been used to produce more valuable creative goods elsewhere in
the economy.
134. At the moment, copyright lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years, or ninety
five years for anonymous works and works made for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c) (2000)
Furthermore, at any time, Congress is free to extend that duration, even for existing works,
subject only to the nearly nonexistent burden of satisfying rational basis scrutiny. See Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204-05 (2003). This compares to an initial term of no more than
twenty-eight years in the original United States Copyright Act. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch.
xv, § I, I Stat. 124. Compared to this nearly seventy year expansion in the copyright term,
the term for a patent has expanded over the same time period by only six years, from an
original term of fourteen years to the present term of twenty years. Compare Act of Apr. 10,
1790, ch. vii, § 1, 1 Stat. 110, III, with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
135. See, e.g., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1956) (explaining that
copyright extends "to any lawful use of their property, whereby they may get a profit out of
it"), agFd sub nom. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
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APPENDIX: FORMAL PROOF THAT PERFECT PRICE
DISCRIMINATION Is NOT NECESSARILY PARETO EFFICIENT IN
A SECOND-BEST WORLD
While the two good discrete model and the two industry continu-
ous model both illustrate the fact that allowing perfect price discrimi-
nation in one market may not increase social welfare in a second-best
analysis, we can also prove the point formally. 136 Consider first the
model used to prove that private production of public goods will not
usually prove Pareto efficient. Suppose that there is an economy with
two goods: a private good (X), and a nonexcludable, nonrival pure
public good (G). Suppose further that the existing production technol-
ogy allows transformation of one unit of labor, L, into either one unit
of Xor one unit of G.
In a two consumer economy,' 37 where each consumer, i, has an
initial labor endowment, l, each consumer seeks to maximize her util-
ity function u'(x1 ,G), where G = g, + g 2 , 38 subject to her budget
constraint, 1i = x i + gi. Assuming that the utility function is well-
behaved, 39 to obtain a Pareto efficient allocation of the available la-
bor, we solve:
Max UI (x ,G) (I)
{x1, x2, G}
Subject to:
u2 (x2 ,G) =u-
-2
where U is some constant level of utility for consumer 2 and
xi + x 2 + G = 11 + 12 (the budget constraint).
Using the Lagrange multiplier technique to solve, we write the
Lagrangean:
136. See supra Part I11.B-C.
137. The model can be readily extended to N consumers.
138. Because G is a pure public good, each consumer receives not only the benefit of her
own purchase of the public good, g, but the benefit of the other consumer's purchase as
well.
139. To solve the model, we must assume that the utility function is strictly quasi-
U - au > ,0 U 
->au 0
concave. Thus, ai and G
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L=u' (x I, G) + A(u 2 (X 2,G) -u 2) + Aull + 12 - X1 - X2 - G) (I a),
where 2 and p are the Lagrangean multipliers.
Taking the partial differential of the Lagrangean for our three
variables, we find:
aL
&I => " = P(2a)
ai r>2uL =, ; and (2b)
x 2  2
-- => U I +  • (2c)
aG
S2u ~
We can rewrite (2c) as - -  1. Substituting for y, using
(2a) and (2b), the Pareto efficient solution is defined by:
1 l2UG + UG (3)
1 2 (3)
UI U2x1  x 2
Equation (3) represents the well-known Samuelson condition.140
To achieve a Pareto efficient outcome in the case of a pure public
good, the summation of each individual consumer's marginal rate of
Ur1
substitution, or G -- , must equal the marginal rate of transforma-
ux
tion of x into G, which was assumed to be 1 at the outset.
To see that markets will not usually achieve an efficient level of
production of public goods, we can compare the Samuelson condition
to the Nash equilibrium that each consumer acting on her own, to
maximize her own welfare, would achieve. Instead of solving (1),
each consumer in this case would solve her individual welfare maxi-
mization problem:
140. Paul Samuelson initially identified this condition in a pair of articles. See Paul A.
Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON.
STATS. 350 (1955); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. STATS. 387 (1954).
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Max u'(xi, G) (4)
{xi, G}
Subject to: x1 + g, = 1,;
G=gl +g 2 ; and
gi 0.
Substituting for xi and G, we can rewrite (4) in terms of g as:
Max u (l9- g,,g+g 2 ) (4a)
Taking the differential of (4a) for consumer I and assuming that
consumer I purchases at least some of the public good, yields:
2I 2U : r u  U G
-u +uG 0 , -or = By the same logic, =1.In other
u x ux
words, both consumers will purchase (or invest labor in producing)
additional units of the public good until the marginal rate of substitu-
tion of the public good for the private equals the marginal rate of
transformation.
The Nash equilibrium (g , g) will thus satisfy:
I 2
N N UN U0gg1 +g 2 =GN, with g, >0 and g2 >0, and 1j _2-,_ 1 .
x /x
But we know that this is not Pareto efficient because it violates the
Samuelson condition. Instead of the sum of the marginal rates of sub-
stitution for all consumers equaling the marginal rate of transforma-
tion, as required by the Samuelson condition, in the Nash equilibrium,
each consumer's marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate
of transformation.
So much is well established in the economics literature. 14' The lit-
erature also establishes that we can achieve a Pareto efficient outcome
in the production of the public good by enabling perfect price dis-
crimination with respect to the public good.' 42 In this context, perfect
price discrimination creates personalized markets for the public good,
where each consumer's consumption of the public good becomes a
distinct commodity with its own market and its own price. If it could
be achieved, the resulting equilibrium, known as a Lindahl equilib-
141. See, e.g., MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 359-64.
142. See, e.g., id.
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rium, would essentially convert the public good into a private good
and ensure a Pareto efficient outcome.'
43
However, we reach quite different conclusions if, instead of pro-
viding each consumer with an initial allocation of labor, li, that can be
used to produce either a private or a public good, we model the same
two good, two consumer economy, but provide each consumer with
an initial allocation of creativity, ci, that can be used only to produce
two different public goods, G and H.




Subject to: hi + gi = ci;
G=g, +g 2;
g > 0;
H=h1 +h 2 ; and
hi >0;
Substituting for Hand G, we can rewrite (5) in terms of g as:
Max u i (c - gl + c 2 - g 2,g + g 2 ) (5a)
{gi}
Taking the differential of (5a) for consumer I and assuming that
consumer I purchases at least some of each public good yields:
-u, +u = =O uH =uG, or -j-=1. By the same logic,
UH
2
2 2 UGUH =UG, or -=1.
UH
The Nash equilibrium (GN) for Equation (5) will thus satisfy:
g1 +g' = G, with c >gV >0 and C2 >g2 >0,
1 2
HN =c I +c 2 -G ,and-j--= 2 -1
U U2ll H
143. See E. Lindahl, Just Taxation - A Positive Solution, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY
OF PUBLIC FINANCE 152, 168-76 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds., Elizabeth
Henderson trans., 1958); see also Jean-Claude Milleron, Theory of Value with Public
Goods: A Survey Article, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 419, 436-51 (1972); MAS-COLELL ET AL.,
supra note 19, at 363--64, 569-70.
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While the marginal rate of substitution in this solution looks simi-
lar to the problematic one in the private-public good model, to see
whether this Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient, we must solve:
Max uI (H,G) (6)
{H,G}
-2 -2
Subject to: u (H,G) = u where u is some constant level of
utility for consumer 2; and H + G = c, + C 2 (the budget constraint).
As we did for Equation (i), we use the Lagrange multiplier tech-
nique to solve and write the Lagrangean:
L =uI(H,G)+2(u2(H,G)u 2 )+it(cI +c 2 -H-G) (6a)
where X and Ri are the Lagrangean multipliers, though they are not
necessarily identical in value to those in Equation (I a).
Taking the partial differential of the Lagrangean for our two vari-
ables, we find:
1_,H = p; and (7a)
aH
= G + 2u = P. (7b)aG
Setting the left-hand side of equations (7a) and (7b) equal to each
other, and rewriting to combine terms, a Pareto efficient outcome
must satisfy:
u G = A u2 G ). (7c)
While we do not know the value of the Lagrangean multiplier A
and cannot therefore fully identify the Pareto efficient solutions, we
do know that in this case, the Nash equilibrium is one such Pareto
efficient solution. Because any Nash equilibrium to the two public
good model requires that u, = u G and U2 =U2, the equality set
forth in Equation (7c) for a Pareto efficient outcome will necessarily
hold for every Nash equilibrium solution.
As a result, where we have a resource such as creativity that must
be allocated between one of two (or more) public goods, the Nash
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equilibrium will be Pareto efficient. Moreover, in this second-best
context, if we were to rewrite the legal rules to enable perfect price
discrimination with respect to one of the public goods, but because of
technological or other limitations could not do so for the other, the
ensuing Nash equilibrium would no longer be Pareto efficient. Indeed,
such a move would essentially re-create the one private-one public
good model and its associated inefficiencies.
So far, we have formally modeled the efficiency consequences of
switching to perfect price discrimination in cases involving one pri-
vate and one public good, and two public goods. A final case that
merits consideration is the one private, two public goods case. To the
extent that a creative person may, depending on the relative returns
available, choose to engage in either creative or uncreative labor, a
one private, two public goods model may be the one that most closely
corresponds to real world conditions.
For such a one private-two public goods model, it can be shown
i I
that Pareto efficiency requires that I = UN =1. In other
words, the Samuelson condition must be satisfied for both public
goods, such that the sum of the consumers' marginal rates of substitu-
tion for each public good equals the marginal rate of transformation.
Similarly, it can also be shown that a Nash equilibrium requiresI 2 I 2
UG UG UH UH 1
I 2 2 'Ux Ux U Ux
x x 
X X
and is thus not Pareto efficient. It would therefore represent a Pareto
improvement if we could implement perfect price discrimination for
both public goods.
But what if we could implement perfect price discrimination for
only one of the public goods? Surely, that represents a step in the right
direction - one more condition for Pareto optimality fulfilled - and
should prove welfare enhancing. Unfortunately, that cannot be estab-
lished as a general proposition. This is precisely the point that Lipsey
and Lancaster proved more than fifty years ago:
[I]t is not true that a situation in which more, but not
all, of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is neces-
sarily, or is even likely to be, superior to a situation
in which fewer are fulfilled. It follows, therefore,
that in a situation in which there exist many con-
straints which prevent the fulfillment of the Paretian
optimum conditions, the removal of any one con-
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straint may affect welfare or efficiency either by rais-
ing it, by lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged. 44
Consider again the one private-two public goods model. Let G",P N
/i, and x,1 be a Pareto efficient solution, and G /, i, and x, be a
Nash solution. Given that the marginal rate of substitution of G for x
equals the marginal rate of transformation for each consumer in the
Nash solution, and that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution
for all consumers equals the marginal rate of substitution in the Pareto
i i
efficient solution, > For this to be true, given the assump-
UN U,
x X
tion that the utility functions are well-behaved, G" > GN,
N PN
xi > x1 , and by the same reasoning, H" > HN. This replicates
the familiar result and shows that the two public goods will be under-
produced in the private market.
Assume that technology or the law changes to enable perfect
price discrimination for G, so that we satisfy the Samuelson condition




H 2-H =1 continues to hold, and let G", H'n,and xn be the1 2
Ux  U x
resulting Nash solution. In order to satisfy the Samuelson condition,
G" > G', reflecting the expected increase in the production of G.
However, given the budget constraint, increasing the production of G
must mean reduced production of both x, and H, thus H" > HN and
n N
xI <x, . This result follows so long as we treat H as an uncorrected
public good market, in which case
I 2
UH = U H
1 2U x  U x
for both i/ and Lt.145 Moreover, given the Nash solution criteria forP n N
H, H" < HN < H P . Consequently, xP < xn < x, and
G" >G" >GN.
144. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 14, at 12.
145. As a result, if either H or x, falls compared to the one private-two public good case,
then the other must fall as well for the Nash equilibrium condition for good H to continue to
hold.
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Given this outcome, we cannot determine whether enabling per-
fect price discrimination with respect to good G increased or de-
creased any consumer's utility, compared to the utility achieved
without price discrimination. The switch increases G's production
relative to x, but it also increases G's production relative to H as well.
While the first is desirable, the second is not. Good H was already
underproduced. Enabling perfect price discrimination for good G
overcorrects for the underproduction problem with respect to good G,
further distorting the market for good H. Whether such a switch
would enhance the welfare of any consumer cannot be determined in
the abstract, but depends entirely upon the market conditions actually
present.
